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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As the second largest economy besides the United States, 
Chi a  ece  ecede ed ec ic g h ha  hake  he d.1 
H e e , i  i  fai   a  ha  Chi a  a e i i i  i  ge e a , a d 
its judicial system in particular, behave rather inadequately in protecting 
investors, 2  especially when it comes to the implementation of its 
corporate bankruptcy law so as to provide creditors with legal certainty.3 
 
* Lecturer of Business Law, School of Law, University of Leeds, England. This article 
mainly benefits from a conversation around the year 2013 with Professor Roman 
Tomasic, my PhD supervisor at Durham University, who suggested that I investigate 
the alternative bankruptcy regime that is in China and how it operates. The author is 
deeply indebted to Professor Tomasic. This article would also be impossible without 
financial support from the British Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) under 
the grant ES/P004040/1, as the ESRC funding makes the fieldwork in China possible. 
Professor Gerard McCormack read the early drafts of this paper and offered valuable 
comments. This paper was presented at a number of conferences, and the author 
wishes to thank conference participants such as Professor Rebecca Parry, Professor 
Roger Halson, and the Right Hon. Lord Sales, the Justice of the Supreme Court, UK, 
for their helpful comments. My daughter Zhang Yuhe helped correct many pinyin 
names of the Chinese companies investigated here, and her linguistic excellence 
should be acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the 
author, and not necessarily to the funding agency. All errors in this paper remain the 
a h  e a  iabi i ie . The a h  ca  be eached b  e ai  a  
z.zhang2@leeds.ac.uk or by post at School of Law, University of Leeds, Liberty 
Building, Leeds, West Yorkshire, England, LS2 9JT United Kingdom. 
1  How China Runs the World Economy, THE ECON. (July 28, 2005), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2005/07/28/how-china-runs-the-world-economy 
(a g i g ha  g ba  age , fi , ice  a d i e e  a e  a e i c ea i g  bei g 
i f e ced b  e e  i  Chi a ).  
2 See World Bank Group, Doing Businesses 2019, Training for Reform, Economy 
Profile: China, WORLD BANK GROUP, 3 (2019), https://www.worldbank.org/content/ 
dam/doingBusiness/media/AnnualReports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf 
(ranking China at a very low position in terms of the efficiency of resolving insolvency 
in China) 
3 See Wojciech Maliszewski et al., Resol ing China s Corporate Debt Problem, (IMF 
Working Paper No. 16/203, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp 
16203.pdf (noting the very limited use of the China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 
in China following the promulgation of this law since 2006).  
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But China has made progress. Shortly after joining the World Trade 
Organisation in 2001,4 probably because of awareness of the correlation, 
if not causation, between establishing a sound legal system and 
economic growth,5 or possibly because of a desire to impress the outside 
world,6 China amended many of its commercial laws,7 including those 
related to bankruptcy. China revised its out-of-date Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation) (the EBL 1986)8 into 
a modern corporate bankruptcy statute, the China Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006), 9  which embraced many 
international best practices and received acclaim both domestically10 
and abroad.11 The EBL 2006 came into effect on June 1, 2007.  
 
4 See Ten Years of China in the WTO: Shades of Grey, THE ECON. (Dec. 10, 2011), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2011/12/10/shades-of-grey (recording that China 
officially joins the WTO on 11 December 2001). 
5 There is abundant literature analyzing the relationship between economic growth and 
the rule of law. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth? 9 
J. ECON. GROWTH 271, 279 (2004), https://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications/d 
o-institutions-cause-growth (noting the correlation between the quality of the rule of 
law and economic growth in surveyed countries). 
6 Campbell Korff & Xinhong Liu, Wh  China s Insol enc  Regimes Must Impro e, 21 
INT L FIN. L. REV. 33, 35 (2002) ( ha  c e i g ha  he h e ce  ( f 
e a i g Chi a  ba k c  a ) ha  bee  i e e ha  i d -dressing to 
appease the WTO ).  
7 See Penelope B. Prime, China Joins the WTO: How, Why, and What Now?, 37 BUS. 
ECON. 26, 32 (2002), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.488 
.581&rep=rep1&type=pdf ( i g Chi a  eff  i  e i i g i  c e cia  a   
comply with the WTO rules). 
8 See Michael Minor & Karen J Stevens-Minor, China s Emerging Bankruptc  La , 
22 INT L L. 1217, 1225 (1988), https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2 
613&context=til (noting many shortcomings of the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law 1986). 
9 For a comprehensive analysis of this law, see Charles D. Booth, The 2006 PRC 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait Is Finally Over, 20 S. AC. L.J. 275 (2008).  
10 See Li Shuguang, Lun Xin Pochanfa Di 30 Tiao Zhong de Zhaiwuren Caichan Zhidu 
( 产 30 中 债务人 产制度) [Asset Scope Under Article Thirty of the 
New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law], 20 Wuhan Ligong Daxue Xuebao Shehui Kexue 
Ban ( 工大学学报 ( 会 学 )) [J. WUHAN U. TECH. (SOC. SCI. ED.)] 7, 7 
(2007), http://www.commerciallaw.com.cn/index.php/home/business/info/id/882.htm 
l (stating that the enactment of the EBL 2006 is a milestone for the Chinese commercial 
law development). 
11 See David L Eaton et al., China s Ne  Enterprise Bankruptc  La , 2 PRATT S J. 
BANKR. L. 543, 543 (2007) (a e i g ha  he EBL 2006 ide  c edi ors and 
i e  i h e ce ai , a a e c , a d ec i ); Rakhi I. Patel, A 
Practical E aluation of the People s Republic of China s 2007 Enterprise Bankruptc  
Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 109, 124 (2009) ( a i g ha  he EBL 2006 i  a sure 
ig  f g e  i  he de i a i  f Chi a  c a e a  egi e); Steven J. 
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The reality, however, is that, as many commentators predicted,12 
the implementation of the EBL 2006 has been even worse than that of 
the previous 1986 law. The annual number of corporate bankruptcy 
cases handled by Chinese courts declined, rather surprisingly, from its 
peak at around 7,000 in 1997 under the old law to some 2,000 per year 
in 2015 under the new law.13 Chinese courts, as a whole, continue to 
unlawfully shun corporate bankruptcy petitions, in violation of Article 
10 of the EBL 2006, which obliges courts to either accept a corporate 
bankruptcy filing or reject it within fifteen days after receiving the filing. 
The reality is that most courts simply ignore the filing so as to avoid 
making an order, depriving the petitioner of the chance to even appeal 
under Article 11 of the EBL 2006.14  
In 2016, persuaded by the Chinese central government, likely 
acting under WTO-rule-compliance pressure from the international 
community, especially from the U.S.,15 the annual number of corporate 
bankruptcy cases recovered to 5,665 a year in 2016 16 and 9,542 in 
 
Arsenault, The Westerni ation of China s Bankruptc : An E amination of China s 
New Corporate Bankruptcy Law through the Lens of the UNCITRIAL Legislative 
Guide to Insolvency Law, 27 PENN ST. INT L L. REV. 45, 87 (2008), 
https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1239&context=psilr 
(ack edgi g ha  i  a  e ec , he e  a  ( he EBL 2006) i  i  acc d i h 
the suggestions and recommendations of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to 
I e c  La );  Emily Lee & Karen Ho, China s Ne  Enterprise Bankruptc  La  
 A Great Leap Forward, but Just How Far?, 19 INT L INSOLV. REV. 145, 155 (2010) 
(praising many innovative provisions in the EBL 2006).   
12 See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday, The Making of China s Corporate Bankruptc  La , 
FOUND. FOR L. JUST. & SOC., 8 (2007), https://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/ 
publications/Halliday.pdf (noting some challenges ahead in affecting how the EBL 
2006 will operate in China); Donald C. Clarke, China: Creating a Legal System for a 
Market Economy, ASIAN DEV. BANK (2007) ( a i g he a h  ca i  i i  
regarding the implementation of the EBL 2006 in the years to come). 
13 The statistics are quoted in a recent study. Shaowei Lin, The Empirical Studies of 
China s Enterprise Bankruptc  La : Problems and Impro ements, 27 INT L INSOLV. 
REV. 77, 85 (2018).  
14 See China: Zombie Firms Will Drag Down Economic Growth, OXFORD ANALYTICA 
DAILY BRIEF SERV. (June 2, 2016), https://search.proquest.com/docview/1793300610/ 
E15C3B43865C4274PQ/1?accountid=147016 (reporting that Chinese courts often 
ignore bankruptcy petitions, especially of private businesses). 
15  See 2016 Report to Congress on China s WTO Compliance, U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, 33 (Jan. 2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-China-
Report-to-Congress.pdf (reporting that the United States asks China to vigorously 
implement its corporate bankruptcy law to protect investors). 
16 Tom Hancock, Zombie Cull Fuels China Bankruptcy Rise, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/35fa6886-fcc9-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30 (report- 
ing the annual number of bankruptcy cases of 2016 in China at 5,665).  
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2017.17 Notwithstanding this mild recovery, the big picture is that an 
estimated 96 per cent of Chinese companies that are bankrupt do not 
enter into the required court-sanctioned corporate bankruptcy procedure 
to solve unpaid debts and to orderly exit the market, rendering them 
unable to use the current bankruptcy law. 18  This situation is very 
unlikely to change as long as the current Chinese judicial system 
remains unaltered.19    
C i ici  f Chi a  he i a i   f  h  i  c a e 
bankruptcy law abound. 20  But for corporate bankruptcy scholars, 
focusing on why China should more vigorously implement its official 
bankruptcy statute might miss the point, since China, to a great extent, 
does not use its formal bankruptcy law to solve corporate 
 
17 See Li Wanxiang, Quanguo Fayuan 2017 Nian Shenjie Qiye Pochan An 6,257 Jian 
(全国 2017 年审 企业 产 6257 件) [Chinese Courts Concluded 6,257 
Corporate Bankruptcies in 2017], Jinji Ribao ( 报) [CHINA ECON. DAILY] (Mar. 
6, 2018), http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201803/06/t20180306_28368370.shtml 
(reporting that Chinese courts opened 9,542 new corporate bankruptcies in 2017 and 
concluded 6,257 cases that year).  
18 See the estimate at an early study in Zinian Zhang & Roman Tomasic, Corporate 
Reorganization Reform in China: Findings from an Empirical Study in Zhejiang, 11 
ASIAN J. COMP. L. 55, 69 (2016). According to a recent report released by the China 
National Company Registration Authority, in 2017, there are 29,072,300 registered 
enterprises in China, excluding around 59,300,000 sole-trader businesses, and given 
that the bankruptcy rate is at some 1 per cent annually, there should be around 290,723 
enterprise bankruptcy cases opened in China as a whole. The contrast between the 
existing 10,000 bankruptcies and the expected 290,723 cases suggests the limited 
extent to which the current corporate bankruptcy law has been implemented in China. 
See also The China National Company Registration Authority, Dang de Shiba Yilai 
Quanguo Qiye Fazhan Fengxi (党 十八以 全国企业发展分 ) [A Report on 
China s Enterprise De elopment Follo ing the 18th Party Congress], Zhongguo 
Gongshang Bao (中国工商报) [THE CHINA INDUSTRY & COM. NEWS] (Oct. 26, 2017), 
http://www.cicn.com.cn//2017-10/26/cms101464article.shtml (noting that in 2017, 
there are 29,072,300 registered enterprises in China nationally).    
19 See Carl Minzner, China after the Reform Era, 26 J. DEMOCR. 129, 132 (2015) 
(noting that China has limited institutional reforms and has no fundamental political 
change).  
20See, e.g., Sally Chen & Joong Shik Kang, Credit Booms  Is China Different? 15 
(IMF, Working Paper No. 18/2, 2018), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publication 
s/WP/2018/wp1802.ashx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Zou Hailing, Gongjice 
Jiegouxing Gaige yu Pochan Chongzheng Zhidu de Shiyong (供 侧 性改 与
产 整制度 ) [The Chinese Supply-Side Reform and the Use of the Company 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Regime], 3 Falü Shiyong ( 律 ) [J. OF L. 
APPLICATION] 57, 60 (2007).  
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bankruptcies.21 Instead, in the event of company bankruptcy, i.e., the 
c a  a e  ca  f  ee  he a e  f i  deb , Chi e e 
courts may use fair distribution, i.e. the pari passu principle, in judgment 
execution as a bankruptcy substitute to seek equal treatment of the 
interests of competing creditors.22  
From the perspective of creditors, this is probably the real, 
accessible Chinese bankruptcy law, which unfortunately, does not bear 
the proper title and is not written in the bankruptcy statute.23 It would 
not be an exaggeration to say that the formal bankruptcy statutes, 
including the EBL 1986 and EBL 2006, are essentially legal tools for 
the Chinese government to either close down money-losing state-owned 
e e i e  ( SOE ), a  a  e he i g  ac i ed before,24 or to 
get rid of so-called zombie companies, 25  especially after the year 
 
21 Professor Charles Booth calls to pay more attention to the real Chinese corporate 
bankruptcy law used in practice, since the formal law is hardly applied in China. See 
Corporate/Debt Restructuring: Japan, the Hong Kong SAR & the People s Republic 
of China, a Roundtable Discussion, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002). See 
also Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 711 
(1994) ( i g ha  i  i  i e f e   ee he i e e a ce f a   he e i  f 
di e  i  Chi a ).  
22 Yong Zhang, Canyu Fengpei yu Pochan zai Qiye Faren Zhaiwu Qingchang Zhong 
de Xuanze Shiyong (参与分 与 产在企业 人债务 偿中 择 ) [The 
Choice Between Fair Distribution and Bankruptcy in Dealing with Corporate Debts], 
11 Renmin Sifa (人 司 ) [PEOPLE S JUDICATURE] 49, 52 (2015). See also Donald 
C. Clarke, Execution of Civil Judgments in China, 141 CHINA Q. 65, 73 (1995) (noting 
that many execution debtors are bankrupt but remain in a judgment execution 
procedure in China).  
23 See Xu Shanghao & Ou Yuanjie, Zhixing Fenpei yu Pochan Huanzhai de Gongneng 
Fenli: Canyu Fenpei Zhidu de Xianshi Chonggou (执 分 与 产 债 功 分
：参与分 制度 实 ) [Separation between Judgment Execution and 
Bankruptcy: Restructuring Fair Distribution in Judgment Execution], 17 Renmin Sifa 
(人 司 ) [THE PEOPLE S JUDICATURE] 102, 104 (2014) (noting that fair distribution 
in judgment executions is actually the bankruptcy substitute in China).   
24 See Li Shuguang, Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years, 1 
HARV. ASIA Q. 1, 1 (2006) (noting that the majority of companies in the formal 
bankruptcy procedure are state-owned or collectively owned in China under the EBL 
1986).  
25 The Editorial Board, China s Zombie Problem, N. Y. TIMES, June 9, 2016, at A22 
( i g ha  Chi a  bie e e i e  a e ba k  a e-owned companies that rely 
on bank loans to stay afloat, which is unsustainable).  
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2016.26 The EBL 2006 and its predecessors, arguably, were not enacted 
for businesses to seek fairness and justice.27  
Fair distribution in judgment execution generally served as the 
de facto bankruptcy substitute from the 1980s28 to 2015, a time when 
he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  a ia  ab i hed hi  egi e i  a  
effort to nudge more commercial judgment executions into formal 
bankruptcy procedures.29 As will be reported later in this article, in view 
of the insurmountable barriers to commence corporate bankruptcy 
procedures, 30  even after 2015, courts still use fair distribution to 
pragmatically solve equal treatment between competing creditors.   
However, there is little research on fair distribution in judgement 
execution as a bankruptcy substitute in China, although there has been 
ig ifica  acade ic d  f Chi a  c e cia  j dg e  e ec i  
system per se, notably by Professors Donald Clarke, 31  Randall 
 
26 See W. Raphael Lam et al., Resol ing China s Zombies: Tackling Debt and Raising 
Productivity 13 (IMF, Working Paper No. 17/266, 2017) (noting that China has 
strengthened its campaign of culling zombie companies, especially since 2016).  
27  See Zhang Lingyun, Chongsu Pochan Chongzheng Zhidu Jili, Peiyu Pochan 
Shichang Zhili Jiegou ( 塑 产 整制度 励，培 产市场 ) 
[Incentivize Businesses to Use China s Corporate Reorgani ation La ], Pochan Fa 
Chazuo ( 产 座) [BANKR. L. TEAHOUSE] 153, 160 (Xu Yangguang & Zhang 
Ting eds., 2017). 
28 Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) (中华人 共和国 事 （ ）) [Civil 
Procedure Law 1982 (For Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Standing 
C . Na  Pe e  C g., Ma . 8, 1982, effective Oct. 1, 1982), art. 180 (stating 
ha  i  he e e  f he e ec i  deb  ba k c , a i a  a ie  f  ec ed 
creditors). 
29 Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minshi Susong Fa  de Jieshi (关
于 《 事 》 ) [The Judicial Notice on the Implementation of Civil 
Procedure Law ( ga ed b  he S . Pe e  C ., Jan. 30, 2015) ], art. 516, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-13241.html. 
30 Apart from courts often refusing corporate bankruptcy filings, the ambiguity of the 
bankruptcy statutes in China is also a factor hampering the use of the new bankruptcy 
law. See generally Mike Falke, China s Ne  La  on Enterprise Bankruptc : A Stor  
with a Happy End?, 16 INT L INSOLV. REV. 63, 74 (2007) (noting that the EBL 2006 
has many gaps left which may hinder the use of the new corporate bankruptcy system 
in China).  
31 Donald C. Clarke, The Execution of Civil Judgments in China, 114 CHINA Q. 65 
(1995); Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The 
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996).  
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Peerenboom,32 and He Xin.33 To fill this gap, this article generally asks 
one simple question: Is fair distribution in judgment executions 
effective in filling the gap left by the virtual absence of bankruptcy law 
in China? Under this general question, there are many specific questions 
that need to be answered. For example, how often is fair distribution 
used in the event of the bankruptcy of execution debtors? Are execution 
creditors treated well under the fair distribution scheme?  And if not, 
what factors hamper the application of fair distribution? Is it the lack of 
bankruptcy filings, as argued by many court officials in China, the cause 
of the meagre use of the corporate bankruptcy law?  
To untangle these questions, a local law court in an eastern 
Chinese city with a population of nine million will be used as a case 
study, with all judgment execution cases concluded in the year 2014 
having generously been made available for the author to inspect. To gain 
an in-depth understanding, in addition, while conducting fieldwork in 
2017 in China, the author interviewed twenty-five professionals, 
including twelve judges and thirteen lawyers who dealt with fair 
distribution in the city. To avoid potential inconvenience, the law court, 
the interviewees and all companies covered have been anonymised in 
this article.34  
Apart from the data directly collected from the court and the 
practitioners, the author derived information concerning most 
judgement executions investigated here from two official websites: the 
China Judgment Online (https://wenshu.court.gov.cn), which publishes 
law court judgments/decisions nationwide and is managed by the China 
S e e Pe e  C , a d he Chi a Na i a  E e i e I f a i  
Database (http://www.gsxt.gov.cn), which provides general information 
f  a  e e i e /b i e e  egi e ed i  Chi a a d i   b  Chi a  
business registration authorities.   
This article proceeds in three major parts. Part I outlines the legal 
framework of the fair distribution rule in judgment execution, and sheds 
light on the laws regulating the interaction between judgment execution 
and bankruptcy in China. Part II reports and analyses findings made 
based on fieldwork conducted in 2017, unravelling the challenges due 
 
32  Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement of 
Arbitral A ards in the People s Republic of China, 1 ASIA PAC. L. & POL Y. J. 1 
(2000); Randall Peerenboom & Xin He, Dispute Resolution in China: Patterns, 
Causes and Progresses, 4 EAST ASIA L. REV. 1 (2009).  
33 See Xin He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China, 
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 419 (2009).  
34  All original and pre-anonymity data sheets and interview materials have been 
confidentially shared with the Columbia Journal of Asian Law.   
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to the virtual absence of formal corporate bankruptcy law and unfolding 
the intrinsic flaws of fair distribution in judgement execution. Part III 
presents findings on whether the abolition of fair distribution in 
judgment execution against company debtors has achieved the goal of 
promoting the use of corporate bankruptcy law in China after 2015. To 
conclude, the key findings of this study will be summarized and some 
policy recommendations will be made.  
 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FAIR 
DISTRIBUTION IN JUDGMENT EXECUTION AND CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCY IN CHINA 
 
Judgment execution is generally governed by the civil procedure 
law in China. Unlike the diverse execution methods/terminologies used 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions,35 the Chinese judgment enforcement 
law uses a unified judgement execution order empowering the execution 
officer, who is an officer of the court and has the same status as a judge, 
to seize and sell any assets of the judgment debtor.36 For competing 
execution creditors, they are in principle, served under the first-past-the-
post rule.37 But the problem is that when the execution officer cannot 
seize sufficient assets to meet the judgment debt, i.e., the debtor is 
ba k  , e e  e, if he j dg e  deb  a e  ca  fully 
 
35 See the landmark articles on the judgment executions in the U.S. David Gray 
Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part One: Liens on New York Real Property, 82 
ST JOHN S L. REV. 1291 (2008); Critique of Money Judgment Part Two: Liens on New 
York Personal, 83 ST JOHN S L. REV. 43 (2009); Critique of Money Judgment Part 
Three: Restraining Notices, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1489 (2013). See also Jeffrey Davis, 
Fi ing Florida s E ecution Lien La  Part T o: Florida Ne  Judgment Lien on 
Personal Property, 54 FLA. L. REV. 119 (2002). As for the English judgment 
execution, see Peter Walton, Execution Creditors  (Almost) the Last Right in 
Insolvency, 32 C. L. W. R. 179 (2003); L d Cha ce  De a e , Effective 
Enforcement: Improved Methods of Recovery for Civil Court Debt and Commercial 
Rent and a Single Regulatory Regime for Warrant Enforcement Agents, Command 
Paper, (Cm 5744, 2003), https://www.publicinformationonline.com/uk-
parliament/command-papers/2002-2003/9780101574426 (a comprehensive UK 
government e  a  he L d Cha ce  De a e ). 
36  Minshi Susong Fa ( 事 ) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the 
S a di g C . Na  Pe e  C g., A . 9, 1991, effec i e A . 9, 1991), arts. 
221 27.  
37 Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (Shixing) (关
于执 工作 干 定（ ）) [Judicial Notice on Judgment Execution] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., July 8, 1998), art. 88 (highlighting the first-
past-the-post principle in judgment execution).  
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meet the payment of more than one judgment creditor, it can be 
challenging to provide justice. 
In the U.K. and the U.S., this scenario would generally trigger a 
bankruptcy procedure. Both these jurisdictions arguably have a pro-
bankruptcy legislative attitude with the aim of prioritising fairness 
between creditors. For example, in England, the execution officer, a 
high court sheriff or a county bailiff, is obliged to hold the proceeds 
ea i ed f  e i g he j dg e  deb  a e  f  14 da , ending 
a potential bankruptcy petition; in the event that a bankruptcy procedure 
is initiated before the 14-day period expires, the execution officer must 
hand the proceeds to the bankruptcy liquidator who will generally serve 
the creditors of the debtor as a whole.38  
Similarly, in the U.S., the execution officer, a supreme court 
sheriff or a county marshal, must divert the proceeds realised from 
execution to the bankruptcy trustee where, prior to the completion of the 
judgment execution, the execution debtor enters into a bankruptcy 
procedure.39 Federal bankruptcy law authorises the bankruptcy trustee 
to nullify any transactions taking placing within 90 days of the 
bankruptcy being filed, supporting the view that in the U.S., bankruptcy 
trumps judgment execution.40  
In the Anglo-American jurisdictions, many may take the 
conversion from judgment execution to bankruptcy for granted. But in 
China, due to the obstacles of moving from judgment execution into 
formal bankruptcy procedures, Chinese lawmakers and the judicial 
system have had to create a practical solution as a workaround, even 
before there was a formal bankruptcy law in 1986.  
 
A. THE LEGAL RULES OF FAIR DISTRIBUTION IN JUDGMENT 
EXECUTION AND BANKRUPTCY BETWEEN 1982 AND 1998 
 
Before 1982, presumably because of the planned economy, all 
factories/businesses in China operated based on orders from the 
government, and potential disputes were solved through administrative 
channels41 so that there was virtually no role played by law courts in 
 
38 The Insolvency Act 1986, Sec. 184. See also ANDREW KEAY & PETER WALTON, 
INSOLVENCY LAW: CORPORATE AND PERSONAL 557 70 (4th ed. 2017).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
39 11 U.S.C. §547.  
40  Id. See also Carlson, Critique Part One, supra note 35, at 1356.  
41 See Fu Lunbo, Guanyu Hetong de Falu Xiaoli Wenti (关于合同 律效力 ) 
[The Enforceability of Commercial Contracts in China], 4 Hubei Caijin Xueyuan 
Xuebao ( 北 学 学报) [J. HUBEI U. FIN.& ECON.] 100, 105 6 (1981).  
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enforcing contracts.42 It was not until 1982 that the Chinese legislature, 
he Chi a Pe e  C g e , e ac ed i  fi  ci i  ced e a e, he 
Chi a Ci i  P ced e La  1982 (F  T ia  I e e a i ) ( Ci i  
P ced e La  1982 ), hich c ai ed he e  f j dg e  
execution and fair distribution.43 The Civil Procedure Law 1982 took 
effect on October 1 that same year.  
It is worth noting that when Civil Procedure Law 1982 was 
promulgated, China had no bankruptcy statute, let alone any judicial 
practice on bankruptcy. 44  Therefore the issue of conversion from 
judgment execution to bankruptcy was categorically off the table at that 
time. To handle potential conflicts between execution creditors chasing 
the same debtor, Article 180 of Civil Procedure Law 1982 stipulated 
that in the event that the judg e  deb  e ceeded he deb  a e   
the debtor was bankrupt  he ceed  f  e i g he deb  a e  
should be used to pay employees at first (the first class), and that if there 
was a surplus, tax creditors (the second class) were paid, followed by 
bank creditors (the third class); 45  other creditors (the forth class, 
unsecured creditors actually, since there was no security law then) were 
placed at the bottom of the repayment hierarchy; but this Article added 
a critical clause at the end: pari passu applied in the case that the 
proceeds could not fully meet the payment of the execution creditors 
ranked in any one of these four classes.46   
To a large extent, Article 180 of the Civil Procedure Law 1982 
is prototypical of the Chinese contemporary bankruptcy practice, 
although it does not appear in a bankruptcy statute.47 It is worth noting 
 
42 See generally BIN LIANG, THE CHANGING CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 1978-PRESENT 
(2008) (chapter 6 especially).  
43 See Tang Weijian, The Evolution of the Civil Procedure System of China, 7 FRON. 
L. CHINA 190, 193 (2012).   
44 Xianchu Zhang & Charles D. Booth, Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging 
Market Economy: The Shenzhen Experience, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 5 (2001) 
(noting that there was little bankruptcy practice in China at that time).  
45 Bank loans are treated as a kind of priority debt because at that time banks are 
government agencies, not business entities. See He Yi, D i Mi hi S g Fa  
Xiugai Caichan Qingchang Zhaiwu Shunxu de Tantao (对《 事 》修改 产
偿债务 序 探 ) [Amending Article 180 of the China Civil Procedure Law 1982 
(For Trial Implementation) on the Debt Repayment Order re the Status of Bank 
Loans], 7 Sichuan Jingrong (四川 ) [SICHUAN FIN.] 64, 64 (1991) (noting why 
bank loans are treated differently from trading debts under the old law in China).  
46  China Civil Procedure Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation), art. 180, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4411.htm.  
47 See Ronald Harmer, Insol enc  La  and Reform in the People s Republic of China, 
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (1996).  
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that judgment debtors under the Civil Procedure Law 1982 include a 
wide range of business entities, including SOEs, as well as individuals 
who are subject to this bankruptcy rule. However, little is known about 
how this provision was implemented in reality.48  
Four years later, for the first time, China enacted an enterprise 
bankruptcy statute49 the EBL 1986, which exclusively applied to the 
bankruptcy of SOEs. It became effective on November 1, 1988.50 Under 
Article 37 of EBL 1986, pari passu applied to unsecured claims.  
Hence, from November 1, 1988 onwards, at least for an SOE 
judgment debtor, if its assets could not fully meet the execution payment, 
a bankruptcy procedure could be opened and pari passu can be invoked 
- thereby all unsecured creditors including execution creditors would be 
treated equally.  By contrast, for a non-SOE judgment debtor, such as a 
private business or an individual, rather than opening a bankruptcy 
procedure, the competing creditors had no option but to remain in the 
judgment execution procedure and to rely on the pari passu principle 
embedded in Article 180 the Civil Procedure Law 1982 for fairness.  
Understanding that enacting a bankruptcy law only for SOEs 
might be theoretically inadequate, the Chinese lawmakers added a 
chapter of bankruptcy for non-SOE businesses when the Civil 
P ced e La  1982 a  e ea ed a d e i ed i  1991 ( Ci i  
P ced e La  1991 ). Cha e  19 f he e i ed law dealt with 
bankruptcy of non-SOE enterprises, and unsurprisingly pari passu was 
the principal distribution rule for unsecured claims under Article 204 of 
Civil Procedure Law 1991.  
 
48 The main trouble would have been the difficulty to enforce money judgments rather 
than how to distribute execution proceeds between competing creditors. See Hu 
Kangshen, L  Mi hi S g Fa (Shi i g)  de Xi di g ( 《 事 （
）》 修 ) [An Analysis of Amending the China Civil Procedure Law 1982 (For 
Trial Implementation)], 3 Zhongguo Faxue (中国 学) [CHINESE LEGAL SCI.] 15, 19 
(1991).  
49 See Cao Siyuan, Shilun Shixing Qiye Pochan Fa de Biyaoxing ( 实 企业 产
必 性) [The Necessity of Having an Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in China], 5 
Gaige (改 ) [REFORM] 25, 25 (1985) (arguing that the communist ideology is not 
incompatible with a bankruptcy law that is to solve business failures taking place in 
any economies).  
50 The China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation) became 
effective three months after the China State Owned Enterprise Law 1988 took effect, 
with the later coming into force on  August 1, 1988, so that the 1986 bankruptcy law 
took effect on November 1, 1988. See Cao Siyuan, Shinian Lai Zhongguo Pochan Fa 
de Lifa yu Shishi (十年 中国 产 与实 ) [The Chinese Bankruptcy Law 
Making and Implementation in the Past Ten Years], 2 Dangdai Zhongguo Yianjiu (当
代中国 ) [MOD. CHINA STUD.] 1 (1997).  
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But it should be emphasized that under both EBL 1986 and the 
bankruptcy chapter (Chapter 19) of the Civil Procedure Law 1991, only 
business enterprises having an independent legal status were eligible for 
a formal bankruptcy procedure, and businesses/enterprises that did not 
have independent legal status and individuals were excluded from the 
use of bankruptcy law. Even though EBL 1986 has been replaced by 
EBL 2006, the legal position remains the same.51   
As for non-legal-person enterprises, in general, the vast majority 
of them are small businesses registered as sole-owner entities. 
According to a recent government report, in China, around 75 percent 
of registered businesses do not have independent legal status.52 If they 
are in financial difficulty and are unable to pay debts, their owners must 
personally bear the ultimate responsibility, and these enterprises cannot 
access the formal bankruptcy law; in other words, investors in this kind 
of businesses cannot enjoy the benefit of limited liability, which seems 
to be exclusively reserved for those of legal-person businesses.53  
Given that the China Civil Procedure Law 1991 repealed the 
Civil Procedure Law 1982,54 Article 180 of the old law providing fair 
distribution in judgment execution was also revoked. But this gives rise 
to a technical vacuum, if not a legislative error.  
When the Civil Procedure Law 1982 was in effect, faced with 
an execution debtor who was a non-legal-person enterprise or an 
individual, the execution creditors could rely on Article 180 of the 1982 
law to seek fairness if the debtor was bankrupt. But after the 1982 law 
was repealed in 1991, the execution creditors had no way to access 
fairness. The 1982 law allowing fair distribution in judgment execution 
stood repealed, and under the new regime, which included the new 
bankruptcy laws and Civil Procedure Law 1991, debtors who were 
 
51 Wang Qin, Zhuanjia: Shishi Geren Pochan Zhidu Keguan Tiaojian Riyi Chengshu (
专家：实 个人 产制度客 件 成 ) [Experts: Time is Ripe for Enacting 
a Personal Bankruptcy Law in China], Fazhi Ribao ( 制 报) [LEGAL DAILY] (June 
29, 2018) (reporting that China is still debating whether there should be a personal 
bankruptcy law in China in 2018).  
52  See THE CHINA NATIONAL BUSINESS REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE 2006 
YEARBOOK OF CHINA S BUSINESS REGISTRATION MANAGEMENT 652 74 (2007).     
53 Geren Duzi Qiye Fa (个人 企业 ) [The China Sole-Owner Enterprise Law 
2000] ( ga ed b  he S . Pe e  C ., A g. 30, 1999, effec i e Ja . 1, 2000), 
art. 31, SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., May 1, 1999, 150 (China), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/content_4750.htm. (stating that where 
the sole- e  e e i e  a e  ca  ee  he a e  f he deb  a  he i e f 
dissolution, the owner must pay the balance).  
54 Civil Procedure Law of 1991, supra note 36, art. 270, http://www.people.com.cn/zix 
un/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/9/9-1-1-01.html.  
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either a non-legal-person enterprise or an individual could not enter into 
a bankruptcy procedure. This unwitting gap remains to be filled.  
O  J  14, 1992, he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  e ea ed a 
comprehensive judicial notice (the 1992 judicial notice) on how to 
properly implement the Civil Procedure Law 1991,55 highlighting two 
major relevant issues. First, to fill the vacuum mentioned above, Article 
297 of the 1992 judicial notice states that where an execution debtor, 
that is a non-legal-person enterprise or an individual, does not have 
sufficient assets to meet the judgment payment of more than one 
execution creditor, fair distribution can be conducted at the request of 
any execution creditors or creditors who have not obtained a final 
judgment but have already sued the debtor in court.56 Put simply, to join 
fair distribution in the execution, the joining creditor must either have 
obtained a final judgement against the common execution debtor and 
have triggered an execution procedure or have registered litigation in 
court against the debtor.  
But Article 297 of the 1992 judicial notice created a new 
difficulty. It allowed the creditor that has not obtained a money 
judgement in its favor but only has filed litigation against the debtor to 
join fair distribution, while there is still uncertainty over whether this 
creditor can ultimately win the case. The probable solution is that the 
execution officer holding the assets of the debtor has to reserve a certain 
proportion of the proceeds for this creditor pending the final result of 
the ongoing litigation.  
The second major issue clarified by the 1992 judicial notice was 
that, according to Article 276, if a legal-person execution debtor does 
not have enough assets to pay execution creditors  the debtor is 
bankrupt  the judgement execution procedure should be converted into 
the bankruptcy one, and in principle, if the bankruptcy procedure is 
opened, all executions against the debtor must be closed.57 It is worth 
repeating an SOE can use EBL 1986 to enter into a court-involved 
 
55 Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minshi Susong Fa  Ruogan 
Wenti de Yijian (关于 《 事 》 干 意 ) [Judicial Notice on the 
Implementation of the Civil Procedure Law 1991] (prom ga ed b  he S . Pe e  
Ct., July 14, 1992), 22 SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., Sept. 20, 1992, 70 (China), 
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/9/9-1-1-08.html. 
56 Han Changyin & Zhu Chunhe, Canyu Fenpei Zhidu he Pochan Lifa (参与分 制
度和 产 ) [Fair Distribution in Judgment Executions and Bankruptcy Regimes], 
1 Dangdai Faxue (当代 学) [CONTEMP. L. REV.], 54 (2000). 
57  Qiye Pochan Fa (Shixing) (企业 产 （ ） ) [The China Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation)], art. 11, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wx 
zl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4475.htm.  
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bankruptcy procedure and that a non-SOE enterprise with an 
independent legal status may alternatively choose Chapter 19 of the 
Civil Procedure Law 1991 to enter into a formal bankruptcy procedure.  
Therefore, after the 1992 judicial notice was released, on paper 
at least, the general principle is that, where the execution debtor is 
bankrupt, a formal bankruptcy procedure can be opened if the debtor is 
a legal-person enterprise. By contrast, if the execution debtor is a non-
legal-person enterprise or an individual, there is no available formal 
bankruptcy procedure and the execution creditors can resort to the fair 
distribution regime under the 1992 judicial notice for fairness.58  
But the real challenge is that the Chinese bankruptcy law, 
including the EBL 1986 and Chapter 19 of the Civil Procedure Law 
1991, is largely a paper tiger.59 In the absence of a functional bankruptcy 
law system, creditors pursuing a legal-person execution debtor that is 
bankrupt were trapped in judgment execution and could only be repaid 
on a first come, first served basis. This is a blatant violation of fairness. 
It should be emphasized that the default first come, first served principle 
is not made by the EBL 1986 or Chapter 19 of the Civil Procedure Law 
1991; instead it is a natural consequence of the absence of a collective 
bankruptcy system, and it is finally confirmed in the judicial notice 
ade b  he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  i  1998.60 Such unfairness 
cannot be ascribed to the bankruptcy law itself but rather to its poor 
implementation.61 This commercial ordeal lasted until 1998.  
 
 
 
 
58 See Yang Lixing, Minshi Zhixing Chengxu Zhong de Canyu Fenpei Zhidu ( 事执
序中 参与分 制度) [Fair Distribution in Civil Judgment Executions], 1 Falü 
Kexue ( 律 学) [LEGAL SCI.], 66, 88 (1994). 
59 Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China  A Case and Agenda for Reforming the 
Insolvency System, THE WORLD BANK GROUP (Sept. 20, 2000), 
http://documents.shihang.org/curated/zh/167691468024327448/pdf/332670REPLAC
EM00Box0304405B0PUBLIC0.pdf (noting that the Chinese bankruptcy law was only 
occasionally used in the 1990s).  
60 Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (关于执 工
作 干 定 （ ） ) [Judicial Notice on Judgment Execution], 
( ga ed b  he S . Pe e  C ., J y 8, 1998, effective July 8, 1998), 3 SUP. 
PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., 91 98 (1998), http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/ 
falv/9/9-1-5-03.html. 
61 The scarce implementation of the China corporate bankruptcy law is well recorded 
in literature. See Lin Shaowei, The Empirical Studies of China s Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law: Problems and Improvements, 27 INT L INSOLV. REV. 77, 85 (2018). 
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B. FULL COVERAGE OF FAIR DISTRIBUTION IN JUDGMENT 
EXECUTION BETWEEN 1998 AND 2015 
 
In realizing that the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law was very 
unlikely to be effectively implemented in the near future, and that many 
societal issues arose due to intense conflicts between competing 
e ec i  c edi , he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  ag a ica  
expanded fair distribution in judgment execution to legal-person 
execution debtors.62 This appears in the judicial notice on judgment 
execution made by the Court and released on July 8, 1998 (the 1998 
judicial notice).63 The new judicial notice comprises two critical points 
concerning fair distribution.  
First, probably to artificially comply with the legislative 
principles enshrined in the two bankruptcy statutes, Article 89 of the 
1998 judicial notice reiterates that a formal bankruptcy petition may be 
suggested by the execution officer if a legal-person execution debtor 
does not have sufficient assets to meet its liabilities. This is politically 
correct but practically obsolete; however, Article 96 of the 1998 judicial 
notice adds a significant related provision, stating that if a legal-person 
execution debtor, which is closed, deregistered or has terminated 
business operation without going through a formal bankruptcy 
procedure, does not have enough assets to pay all its debts, the fair 
distribution regime previously tailored for non-legal-person execution 
debtors could also be used in the interest of fairness between execution 
creditors. Therefore, finally, fair distribution in judgment execution now 
covers execution debtors of all kinds, regardless of whether the 
execution debtor is a legal-person enterprise, a non-legal-person entity 
or an individual. Some argue that the 1998 judicial notice officially 
confirmed fair distribution in judgment execution as a full bankruptcy 
substitute in China.64      
 
62 See Liu Guixiang & Huang Jinglong, Pingdeng Fenpei Zhidu yu Pochan Zhidu de 
Fengong (平 分 制度与 产制度 分工 ) [The Boundary Between Fair 
Distribution in Judgment Executions and Bankruptcy], Renmin Fayuan Bao (人
报) [THE PEOPLE S COURT DAILY], Apr. 30, 2014, at 8 (noting that the making of 
the1998 judicial notice on judgement execution is largely because the poor 
implementation of the formal bankruptcy law in China).  
63 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
64 See Qi Shujie & Chen Hongjie, Pochan Chengxu yu Zhixing Chengxu de Chongtu 
ji Qi Xietiao ( 产 序与执 序 冲 及其协 ) [The Conflicts between 
Bankruptcy and Judgment Execution], 3 Xiamen Daxue Xuebao (厦 大学学报) [J. 
XIAMEN U.] 107, 108 (2007).  
2019]  THE CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY SUBSTITUTE 187 
 
 
Second, the 1998 judicial notice narrows down the potential fair 
distribution beneficiaries. Under Article 90 of this notice, the creditor 
wishing to apply for fair distribution by joining in an existing execution 
procedure, in which the key assets of the debtor have been seized, must 
have already obtained a final money judgement in its favor. The 1992 
judicial notice had allowed for a second group of creditors that had sued 
the same debtor but not obtained a final judgment to take part in fair 
distribution;65 this group of creditors ended up deprived of this right by 
he 1998 j dicia  ice. The Chi a S e e Pe e  C  does not 
explain the justification for this change. This is probably another policy 
error, or can be explained by the possibility that the Court tends to favor 
creditors taking early actions.   
A careful reading of the said rules reveals that fair distribution 
in judgment execution is regulated only by the two judicial notices 
i ed b  he Chi a S e e Pe e  C , a he  ha  b  a  a e  
ga ed b  he Chi a Pe e  C g e .66 The Civil Procedure 
Law 1982 which provided the initial basis was repealed in 1991.  
For some legal idealists, however, it seems to be a constitutional 
ffe e c i ed b  he Chi a S e e Pe e  C , i  i g 
 he d ai  f he Chi a Pe e  C g e . The  ea  ha  if a 
legal-person enterprise is bankrupt amid a judgment execution 
procedure, creditors should be allowed to seek fairness by changing 
execution into a formal bankruptcy procedure, and that providing 
limited fairness by using the fair distribution rule in judgment execution 
according to the 1998 judicial notice is a violation of both the spirit and 
the letter of the two formal bankruptcy statutes, i.e., EBL 1986 and the 
Civil Procedure Law 1991.67 The critics are right. But they did not 
account for what was happening on the ground.  
 
65 See Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 57, art. 297.   
66 See Chen Zhixing, Minshi Zhixing Canyu Fenpei Zhidu de Kunjing yu Jinlu ( 事
执 参与分 制度 困境与 ) [Fair Distribution in Judgment Executions: 
Problems and Prospects], 29 Shanghai Zhenfa Xueyuan Xuebao (上 政 学 学报
) [J. SHANGHAI U. POL. SCI. & L.], 82 (2014).  
67 The leading figure criticizing fair distribution in judgment execution is Professor 
Wang Xinxin, a prominent bankruptcy law authority in China. See Wang Xinxin, 
Canyu Fenpei Zhidu Buying yu Puochan Fa Chongtu (参与分 制度不应与 产
冲 ) [Fair Distribution in Judgment Executions Must Not Contradict the Bankruptcy 
Law], Renmin Fayuan Bao (人 报) [THE PEOPLE S COURT DAILY], Apr. 30, 
2014, at 8 (advocating the abolition of fair distribution in judgment executions for 
legal-person debtors). See also Zhu Lianghao, Dui Woguo Minshi Zhixing Canyu 
Fenpei Zhidu de Fansi (对我国 事执 参与分 制度 反思) [Some Reflection on 
Fair Distribution in Judgment Execution], 2 Shehui Kexue ( 会 学) [J. SOC. SCI.], 
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Ne e he e , a  beca e f he Chi a S e e Pe e  
C  ca aig   e he j dg e  e ec i  c d  i  
recent years, the fair distribution regime in judgment execution against 
legal-person execution debtors was, in principle at least, ultimately 
repealed in 2015. But judicial notices apply in judgment execution 
where the execution debtor is a non-legal-person business or an 
individual.  
For the remainder of this article, judgment execution means that 
against legal-person debtors, unless stated otherwise.   
 
C. FAIR DISTRIBUTION IN JUDGMENT EXECUTION FROM 2015 
ONWARDS 
 
The fair distribution regime was originally designed to deal with 
bankrupt judgment execution debtors that were non-legal-person 
entities or individuals mainly because of the absolute absence of a 
formal bankruptcy law for them, and was later pragmatically extended 
to bankrupt legal-person execution debtors in 1998 because of the 
weakness in the implementation of the formal corporate bankruptcy law 
on this group of business entities in China.  
It is worth noting that, in 2006, China promulgated EBL 2006, 
which replaced both EBL 1986 applying to SOEs and Chapter 19 of the 
Civil Procedure Law 1991 applying to non-SOE legal person enterprises. 
As noted in the introduction, the EBL 2006 remains scarcely 
implemented as well.68  
On January 30, 2015, the China Supre e Pe e  C  
released an updated judicial notice (the 2015 judicial notice) facilitating 
the implementation of the newly-amended China Civil Procedure Law 
2012. 69  Surprisingly, the 2015 judicial notice terminated the fair 
distribution in judgment execution against legal-person execution 
 
52, 56 (2003) (insisting to abolish fair distribution in judgment execution against legal-
person debtors); Wu Xiaojing, Xianxing Canyu Fenpei Zhidu Genben Quexian yu 
Gaijin Jianyi ( 参与分 制度 与改 建 ) [The Current Fair 
Distribution Rule in Judgment Executions: Deep-Rooted Flaws and Prospects], 1 Falü 
Shiyong ( 律 ) [J. LEGAL APPLICATION] 115, 118 (2008) (calling the revocation 
of fair distribution in judgment execution).    
68 See Booth, supra note 9, at 275; Zhang & Tomasic, supra note 18, at 69; See also 
Stacy Steele et al., Trends and Developments in Chinese Insolvency Law: The First 
Decade of the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 669 (2018).  
69 Guanyu Shiyong Minshi Susong Fa  de Jieshi (关于 《 事 》
) [The Judicial Notice on the Implementation of Civil Procedure Law], (promulgated 
b  he S . Pe e  C ., Dec. 18, 2014, effec i e Feb. 4, 2015), SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. 
GAZ., 3 (2015), http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-13241.html. 
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debtors 70  in the hope of boosting the use of the formal corporate 
bankruptcy law, the EBL 2006. This judicial notice took effect on 
February 4, 2015. 71  The 2015 judicial notice, however, retains fair 
distribution in judgement execution against non-legal-person and 
individual execution debtors, because there is still no formal bankruptcy 
law for them.72  
More specifically, Article 513 of the 2015 judicial notice 
stipulates that in the course of a judgment execution procedure against 
a legal-person debtor, which is usually a limited liability company, the 
execution court should suspend the execution procedure in the event that 
the execution debtor is bankrupt under Article 2 of the EBL 2006 and 
should, following the consent of any execution creditor or of the 
execution debtor, send an execution-to-bankruptcy request to the court 
that has the jurisdiction over the bankruptcy of the execution debtor.  
The court that has the jurisdiction over the bankruptcy of the execution 
debtor will assess whether to open a formal bankruptcy procedure under 
EBL 2006. This arrangement should be understood in the context that, 
de  e f he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  icie , he c a e 
bankruptcy procedure can only be opened in the court where the 
execution debtor has the domicile.73 Article 514 of the 2015 judicial 
notice adds that the requested court should make a decision within 30 
days of receiving the request.  
Article 515 of the 2015 judicial notice envisages two scenarios: 
first, if the bankruptcy court responds positively and decides to open a 
bankruptcy procedure - a happy outcome - the execution court will close 
the execution. This implies that the levied assets will also be handed to 
the bankruptcy trustee and are to form part of the bankruptcy estate of 
the debtor. And second, if declined, the execution court must resume the 
execution, highlighting that, under Article 516 of the 2015 judicial 
notice, the execution creditors will be paid out of the realized assets of 
the debtor on a first come, first served basis. This suggests that fair 
distribution is not available in judgment execution against legal-person 
execution debtors any longer. This pronounces, on paper at least, the 
 
70 Id. at art. 516.  
71 Id. at preface.  
72 Id. at arts. 508 12. 
73 Guanyu Shenli Qiye Pochan Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (关于审 企业
产 件 干 定 ) [The Judicial Notice on Several Issues of Corporate 
Ba k c  T ia ] ( ga ed b  he S . Pe e  C ., J y 18, 2002, effective 
Sept. 1, 2002), SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ., 155 (2002), http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Detai 
ls/35856530187aef46213241d72a3c94.html?sw=%e4%bc%81%e4%b8%9a%e7%a0
%b4%e4%ba%a7%e6%a1%88%e4%bb%b6.   
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end of the fair distribution regime in judgment execution against legal-
person enterprises from February 4, 2015 in China onward.  
But, to what extent has the 2015 judicial notice been successful 
in influencing the actual proceedings before courts? That answer will be 
reported later in the findings.  
After all, fair distribution in judgment execution mingles with 
bankruptcy, mainly because the Chinese formal bankruptcy law system 
remains underdeveloped. For creditors, one thing is certain: seeking 
fairness through a formal bankruptcy procedure is largely unrealistic, 
since opening a bankruptcy procedure under the Chinese bankruptcy 
law is practically insurmountable; the problem is whether fairness can 
be obtained by resorting to fair distribution in judgment execution. This 
is what this study aims to investigate. 
  
III. THE FINDINGS OF THE USE OF FAIR DISTRIBUTION IN JUDGMENT 
EXECUTION AGAINST COMPANY DEBTORS AND OF ITS CHALLENGES 
 
To untangle the extent to which the fair distribution mechanism 
replaces corporate bankruptcy law, one would need to identify how 
often the fair distribution regime is adopted in judgment execution. The 
findings below will highlight observations of practitioners concerning 
the challenges they face when using the fair distribution approach. 
  
A. THE METHODS OF CHOOSING ELIGIBLE JUDGMENT EXECUTION 
CASES AND EXECUTION DEBTORS 
 
Before presenting the data, the court providing the basic 
statistics should be briefly introduced. The court is in the Yangtze delta 
region in eastern China and is located in its provincial capital city with 
a population of 9 million. Within the hierarchy of the Chinese court 
system, the court is a prefecture intermediate court handling many first 
instance large-claim commercial disputes, and also dealing with appeals 
from the 14 county courts under its jurisdiction. 74  This court is 
somewhat similar to the London High Court in status and in function.75  
During the whole of 2014, the court concluded a total of 876 
judgment executions. A five-step analysis was conducted to identify the 
 
74  Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial 
Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 100 (2004) 
(examining the Chinese court system in great details).  
75 GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 167 (13th ed. 2012).  
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judgment executions involving fair distribution for the purpose of 
review.  
First (step one), the chosen judgement execution should be 
commercial in nature, which means that criminal judgment execution 
must be excluded. Of the total 876 judgment executions, there are 44 
criminal ones, 15 of them enforcing criminal fines and 29 enforcing 
criminal victim compensation awards.76 With these 44 criminal cases 
removed, there are 832 judgment executions left.  
Second (step two), the executions to collect court fees should 
also be discarded, since these cases are not a proper concern for fairness 
between competing creditors. The legality over the executions to collect 
court fees aside, in 2014, there are 201 judgment executions initiated by 
the court itself to recover the court fees, and following the removal of 
these cases, there are 631 judgment executions remaining.  
Third (step three), the eligible judgment execution must have at 
least one execution debtor that is an enterprise and is subject to the EBL 
2006 if bankrupt, because this study is to investigate the extent to which 
fair distribution replaces the EBL 2006.77 To meet this criterion, there 
are 166 judgment executions that lack qualified enterprises as execution 
debtors and must be removed. After going through the third step, there 
are 465 executions left on the list.  
All these 465 judgment executions have at least one execution 
debtor as an enterprise that is subject to the EBL 2006. If the enterprise 
debtor is bankrupt before or during the execution procedure, the EBL 
2006 can, in theory, be used to open a formal bankruptcy procedure. If 
the bankruptcy procedure cannot be accessed, then the fair distribution 
regime, the bankruptcy substitute, can apply to serve competing 
execution creditors with fairness, at least in principle.  
Among these 465 cases, if the execution debtor, a legal-person 
enterprise, is unable to pay the execution debt in full, the EBL 2006 can 
be used to address the insolvency of the debtor in the interest of fairness 
for creditors. And it is equally true that if the execution claim has been 
fully paid, irrespective of whether the execution debtor voluntarily paid 
the claim or has been forced to pay, this execution should be removed 
from the eligibility list. This is because the execution outcome does not 
 
76 Bingzhi Zhao, Outline of Reforming China s Penal S stem, 4 FRONTIERS L. IN 
CHINA 376, 381 (2009) (anecdotally noting the difficulty of enforcing criminal fines 
in China).  
77 To be precise, it should be the EBL 2006 and its predecessors, including the EBL 
1986 and Chapter 19 of the China Civil Procedure Law 1991. But for simplicity, this 
article uses the EBL 2006 to generally represent the Chinese corporate bankruptcy 
law, unless stated otherwise.   
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provide evidence proving the bankruptcy of the debtor. This is the fourth 
step (step four) taken to remove irrelevant executions. After checking 
he c  2014 c c ded j dg e  e ecution list, of the 465 judgment 
executions against legal person enterprises, the execution claim was 
fully recovered in 223 cases (47.96%).  
However, in the course of searching for complementary 
information from the China Judgment Online, there are another 11 
executions in which the execution claim was fully satisfied mainly 
beca e he e ec i  deb  a  ec ed, b  he c  2014 j dg e  
execution list, for unknown reasons, recorded them as zero recoveries. 
Hence, this list should be objectively updated. In light of this revision, 
the total number of the full recovery executions is increased to 234; with 
these 234 cases removed, there are 231 executions remaining on the list 
that should be further examined. 
In these 231 executions, the execution creditor was either 
partially paid or got a zero recovery. But an additional action should be 
taken in the fourth step. Among the 231 executions, there are 44 
executions that should be taken off on the grounds that although the 
execution creditor was not fully paid, these cases, for different reasons, 
did not end up using either bankruptcy law or fair distribution to tackle 
fairness concerns; these 44 executions cases either ended with a 
settlement or were sent to other courts for execution.  
With the removal of these 44 executions, there are 187 ones 
remaining on the list. These 187 executions were carried out against 
legal-person enterprise debtors that were not able to fully pay judgment 
debts and were financially bankrupt. In principle, all of them should 
have gone through a formal bankruptcy procedure under the EBL 2006, 
but the reality is that most of them were not able to do so.  
The next step (step five), distinct from the first four steps 
identifying the individual execution procedures as cases, moves to 
identifying execution debtors with the aim of assessing whether fair 
distribution should apply if the formal bankruptcy procedure against a 
particular debtor was not opened. On the final list of 187 executions, 
there are a total of 182 execution debtors that are subject to the EBL 
2006. It is worthwhile to note that all individuals and non-legal-person 
enterprises involved in these 187 executions were simply dropped and 
were not investigated, since as noted before, these parties are not subject 
to the EBL 2006.  
Although technically these debtors were bankrupt in both legal 
and financial terms, this still does not mean that fair distribution should 
be used in this situation. To apply the fair distribution regime, there 
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should be at least two execution creditors pursuing the same execution 
debtor, which usually suggests that there are at least two execution 
procedures opened against one debtor. If there is only one execution 
creditor chasing the debtor, fair distribution is unnecessary, since there 
is no conflict between different execution creditors, in spite of the 
justification of using a formal bankruptcy procedure.   
The analysis for gleaning whether there were at least two judgment 
executions against each of these 182 debtors involved in the total of 187 
executions occurred in two stages: 
x The first stage was quite simple and easy, since checking the 
final list of these 187 executions provided by the court could 
give a solid answer. The first stage comfortably identified 35 
enterprise debtors that are listed as execution debtors more 
than once by different execution creditors in this court, 24 
enterprise debtors taken action against twice or more but by 
the same execution creditor, and 123 that were only chased 
once. The remaining two categories, for a total of 147 
debtors, should be further investigated at the second stage.   
x In contrast to the easy and quick first stage, the second stage 
was considerably more time-consuming. The second stage 
heavily relied on the official information disclosure website, 
the China Judgment Online. 78  This website was used to 
search whether each of these 182 execution debtors had been 
forced to pay other judgment debts in this court before or in 
other courts. It is fair to say that, without accessing this 
website, this study would have been considerably weakened. 
But the caveat is that this study could be a more accurate 
estimate because court judgments and orders from this 
website are still far from complete.79  
After going through the labour-intensive second stage, 
along with the 35 debtors identified during the first stage, 
another 119 execution debtors meet the criteria and should 
be retained on the list on the basis that these debtors were 
bankrupt and were subject to more than one judgment 
 
78 Xinhua, Chinese Courts Publish Judgment Documents Online, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 
27, 2013), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/27/content_17136289.htm.   
79 Benjamin L. Liebman et al., Mass Digitization of Chinese Court Decisions: How to 
Use Text as Data in the Field of Chinese Law, 13 (Colum. Pub. L. and Theory, 
Working Paper No. 14-551) https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=3585&context=faculty_scholarship (reporting that around 50-70% of court 
decisions are uploaded online and that in some county courts there are probably only 
up to 20% of court decisions uploaded as required).  
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execution by different execution creditors. For example, 
Herui Modern Power Facilities Limited appears once on the 
2014 execution debtor list of this court and was forced to pay 
the judgment debt of RMB 3,407,435.53 
(US$ 507,549.71),80 but only a payment of RMB 23,121.36 
(US$ 3,443.96) was made; however, the China Judgment 
Online shows that, during the same year 2014, Herui was 
asked by another court to pay another execution debt of 
RMB 3,414,575.00 (US$ 508,264.95), but paid nothing. 
Technically, the executions against Herui should have 
considered fair distribution, so it is retained on the final list 
to be examined in further detail. All these 119 debtors fall 
into this category.  
In fact, during the second stage, some of the 35 execution 
debtors identified in the first stage were also found to be subject to 
execution by other courts. For instance, Shanda Garment Limited 
appears four times as the execution debtor in the four executions in this 
court in the Yangtze Delta Region, but the China Judgment Online 
reveals that actually, in 2014, the company was called three times by 
other courts to pay execution debts.  
Up until now, 154 execution debtors exist on the survey list, and 
the remaining 28 debtors should be removed. These 28 debtors were 
only subject to judgment execution once, and since there were no 
contesting execution creditors, it is unnecessary to use fair distribution 
in such circumstances.  
With these 28 debtors gone, after the five steps have been 
undertaken, there are now 154 eligible debtors left, 153 of them 
companies and the final one a private school.  
 
B. KEY FINDINGS ABOUT THE USE OF FAIR DISTRIBUTION 
 
On the final list of 154 execution debtors, 18 debtors, all of them 
companies, ultimately entered into the formal bankruptcy procedure. 
Three of them proceeded in this court and 15 in others.  
After the removal of these 18 companies, there are now 136 
entities remaining, 135 of which are companies and one of which is a 
private school. It is worth highlighting that these 136 debtors were 
 
80  The amount of debt in US dollars is an estimate by using the exchange rates 
published by XE Currency Converter at www.xe.com, a popular website for foreign 
exchanges. All subsequent estimates use this method to help the reader to better 
appreciate what happens in these cases.  
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bankrupt, were chased by more than one execution creditor for the 
payment of judgment debts, and were supposed to be subject to the 
alternative fair distribution scheme since a formal bankruptcy procedure 
was not opened.  
The collected data show that fair distribution, as shown in Table 
1, was only applied in the execution of 15 debtors.  
 
No. Company Venue Assets  EBL 2006 
Procedure 
Triggered?  
Fair 
Distribution 
Materialised? 
Creditor 
from this 
Court 
Included? 
1 Guogang 
Industry 
This Court Real 
Property   
Yes  Missing  Yes  
2 Guogang 
Hotel  
This Court  Real 
Property   
Yes  Yes  Yes  
3 Wang Yi 
Tourism  
A Third 
Court 
(outside 
province) 
Real 
Property 
Yes  Yes  No  
4 Taitai Water  A Third 
Court 
(outside 
province) 
Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  No (finally 
rejected)  
5 Jianzhen 
Construction  
A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  No  
6 Shanda 
Fashion  
A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  No  
7 Keheng 
Machinery & 
Electronics 
This Court  Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  Yes 
8 Tai Yuan 
Xing 
Microelectro
nics 
This Court  Real 
Property  
Yes  No (Nothing 
Left after 
Meeting the 
Secured Claim)  
No  
9 Jialan 
Energy  
A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  Yes  
10 Wester 
Technology 
A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  Yes  
11 Chuanzhong 
Construction 
A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property  
Yes  No (Nothing 
Left after 
Meeting the 
Secured Claim)  
No  
12 Longchen 
Textile  
A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  Yes  
13 Hangda 
Science   
A Third 
Court  
Cash  Yes  Yes (only for 
employees)  
No  
14  Xing Tian Di 
Industry  
A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property  
Yes  Yes  Missing  
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No. Company Venue Assets  EBL 2006 
Procedure 
Triggered?  
Fair 
Distribution 
Materialised? 
Creditor 
from this 
Court 
Included? 
15  Yadi Science  A Third 
Court  
Real 
Property 
& 
Vehicles  
Yes  Yes  No  
Table 1 The Fifteen Fair Distribution Events 
S ce: The A h  Da a C ec i  
 
Given that fair distribution was supposed to be used in the 
execution of all these 136 debtors, fifteen fair distribution events mean 
that only 11 per cent replace bankruptcy in providing, albeit limited, 
fairness for execution creditors. Apparently, it is implausible to reach 
the conclusion that fair distribution adequately fills the gap left by the 
virtual absence of bankruptcy law in China. 
This finding may also suggest that the notion that bankruptcy 
law has been usurped by fair distribution lacks evidence to support it 
and is largely untrue.81 Resorting to fair distribution is meant to alleviate 
the unfairness due to the weak implementation of the formal bankruptcy 
law.   
The typical use of fair distribution would be execution against 
the company, for example in the case of Keheng Precision Machinery 
& E ec ic  Li i ed ( Kehe g ). Be ee  2012 a d 2014, Kehe g 
was sued at least 44 times by different creditors,82 and there were six 
judgment execution cases that proceeded in this court and 38 ones 
handled in other cour . Thi  c  ei ed Kehe g   a ab e a e , 
he c a  a  a d i  e igh  f he cc ied a d. The c  
eventually managed to sell, by auction, the seized assets for RMB 
69,400,000.00 (US$ 10,265,815.00) in 2014; provided that the court 
duly received the fair distribution requests from its fellow courts on 
behalf of other 38 execution creditors, fair distribution was carried out 
to equally protect all of them; 44 execution claims involving 42 different 
creditors (one creditor has three separate execution claims against 
Keheng) were paid at 13 cents in yuan each; for example, the execution 
creditor,  Sanlu Bearing Fittings Factory, had an execution claim of 
RMB 566,216.19 (US$ 83,581.71) and was paid RMB 75,279.14 
(US$ 11,112.27).  
 
81 Wang, supra note 51, at 8.  
82 China Judgment Online, http://zxgk.court.gov.cn/zhongben/ (shows that Hengke 
was forced to pay judgment debts at least 75 times before the end of 2014.)  
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As for the venue of these 15 fair distribution cases, four took 
place in this court and 11 in other fellow courts, nine of which are from 
the same province and two from outside (see Table 1 above). In 
principle, since all these 136 debtors were bankrupt, fair distribution 
was assumed to be used in their judgment executions; the fact that 15 
cases took place in practice raises the question: why is it rarely used? 
 
C. WHY IS FAIR DISTRIBUTION SELDOM APPLIED? 
 
Among many reasons, the first and most fundamental reason that 
fair distribution is seldom applied would be the difficulty, or the lack, 
of communication between different execution procedures.  
Generally speaking, each execution is an independent and 
separate case, as it should be. Once the execution application has been 
registered and the court execution fees are duly paid, the court will 
allocate it to an individual execution officer to handle. The routine 
practice is that apart from relying on the execution creditor providing 
he i f a i  f he deb  a e , he e ec i  ffice  i , f e  
on request, visit the local real property registration authority to search 
whether the debtor has real properties like building, offices and houses 
to seize, go to the local vehicle registration authority to check whether 
the debtor has cars or trucks to levy upon, and occasionally ask for 
information from the local business registration authority as to whether 
the company owes shares in other companies. Of course, the quickest 
and most effective solution is that if there is sufficient cash in the 
deb  ba k acc , he e ec i  ffice  ca  i edia e  ei e a d 
f cef  a fe  i   he c  ecia  e ec i  acc , hich i  
be later paid to the execution creditor, but this depends on both whether 
the execution creditor can provide an accurate bank account as well as 
the financial state of the execution debtor.  
In practice, the execution creditor must also check its own 
accounting records; if by luck the execution debtor had previously used 
the formal banking system to make a payment, examining the historic 
a fe  a  ca  ide i f a i  i  he deb  ba k acc , 
such as the account number and the name of the bank. This sounds easy, 
but the problem is that some companies may have numerous bank 
accounts, most of which the execution creditor does not know. 
Sometimes, the execution creditor does not have any information about 
he deb  ba k acc  a  a . F  a hea hy execution debtor 
c a , i   ca e , he c  i e ac i  f e i g  he 
deb  ba k acc  d f  ee  he e ec i  c ai , a d hi  i  
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probably why, as reported earlier, almost half of the judgment 
executions against enterprises in this court were entirely successful.83  
But the challenge is that for bankrupt execution debtors, as 
examined in this study, this easier way of execution is often unrealistic. 
To make matters worse, when dealing with a bankrupt execution debtor, 
if the only assets of the debtor were seized by one execution court, how 
can a second execution court be informed so as to make fair distribution 
possible? The lack of coordination/communication between different 
executions is likely a major hurdle hampering the use of fair distribution.  
Also, it should not be forgotten that, of the 136 execution debtors 
that were bankrupt and should have been subject to fair distribution to 
fairly protect execution creditors, the claims were not fully met. In the 
most ideal world, for the execution court that took the first action and 
found that the debtor did not have sufficient assets to pay the judgement 
and was bankrupt, if a formal bankruptcy procedure could have been 
immediately opened, first, the coordination between the first court and 
other courts is redundant, since all enforcements will be channelled into 
the bankruptcy procedure. Second, the following repeated execution 
efforts could be avoided, which would make the Chinese judicial system 
as a whole considerably more efficient.84 But it is unknown why the 
Chinese judicial system did not choose to do this.85 One explanation 
may be that accepting a bankruptcy case for a court behind the back of 
the local government is, rather bizarrely, treated as political stigma, and 
that the local government sees a rising number of corporate bankruptcy 
 
83 See Hu Zhiguang ( 志光), Jiben Jiejue Zhixing Nan de Difang Shijian (基 决
执 地 实 ) [Local Practice of Solving Judgment Execution Conundrums], 5 
Zhongguo Yingyun Faxue (中国应 学) [CHINA REV. ADMIN. JUST.] 133, 139 
(2018) (I  he She he  I e edia e Pe e  C , i  i  e ed ha  f  a d 10 
per cent of judgment executions, the execution officer seizes enough cash from the 
deb  ba k acc , a d ha  a he  10 e  ce  ee  he a  f  a e  b  
the execution debtor.) 
84 Liu & Huang, supra note 62, at 8 (arguing that it is a huge waste for there to be 
repeated executions against the same company when the company does not have assets 
to be levied); see also Lin Zupeng & Li Hao, Jianyi zai Sifa Zhixing Zhong Jianli 
Qiangzhixing Pochan Zhidu ( 建 在司 执 中建 强制性 产制度 ) 
[Compulsory Conversion from Judgment Execution to Bankruptcy], 5 Zhengzhi yu 
Falü (政 与 律) [J. POL. SCI. & L.] 7, 8 (1998) (lamenting the similar waste caused 
by the lack of bankruptcy procedures).  
85 See Elizabeth M. Lynch, China s Rule of Law Mirage: The Regression of the Legal 
Profession since the Adoption of the 2007 Lawyers Law, 42 GEO. WASH. INT L L. REV. 
535, 535 (2010) (revealing the hypocrisy of the Chinese law-making process and its 
implementation, which are to enhance state interests under the guise of protecting 
citizens).     
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cases as a political failure, meaning that the court system does whatever 
it can to shun corporate bankruptcy filings. This may appear irrational, 
but it works well for self-serving local politicians who can control local 
courts.86    
Expecting an execution officer to advertise what she or he has 
seized from the execution debtor, even in the context of bankruptcy, 
would be awkward, and this ironically suggests that it is naïve for some 
to argue that execution officers have a moral obligation to disclose.87  
A classic example of the lack of communication between courts 
is the executions against the company Li Hui Jia Engineering 
Technology Limited (Li Hui Jia). The company was the execution 
debtor in this court in 2014, but it was subject to at least 11 judgment 
executions in total; regarding the execution in this court, the execution 
creditor China Construction Bank Limited got nothing, but one of the 
c a  e ec i  c edi , Da L g C nstruction Materials Firm, 
successfully obtained a RMB 443,190 (US$ 65,936.17) payment by 
i f i g i  e ec i  c , he Qi g ha  C  Pe e  C , 
Baotou, Inner Mongolia, that the  debtor had an uncollected receivable 
worth more than the execution claim from Xiaohang Steel Structure 
Limited, a financially healthy company. The Qingshan Court seized the 
receivable from Xiaohang and paid Da Long in full. A happy ending for 
Da Long, but not for other execution creditors, including the execution 
creditor, China Construction Bank Limited, in this court, who got 
nothing; in theory, such a receivable should be subject to fair 
distribution in the interests of all execution creditors, but due to the 
absence of communication, most execution creditors missed the chance 
for their share, since they even did not know what happened in the 
Qingshan Court. There is no coordinated action between courts, and 
there should not be any.  
 
86 See Cao Siyuan ( 思 ), Shinian Lai Zhongguo Pochan Fa de Lifa yu Shishi (十
年 中国 产 发图实 ) [The Enactment and Implementation of the 
Bankruptcy Law in China in the Recent Decade], 2 Dangdai Zhongguo Yianjiu (当代
中国 ) [MOD. CHINA STUD.] (1997), http://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/ 
issues/past-issues/57-mcs-1997-issue-2/400-2011-12-29-17-45-11.html. 
87 Liu Pengju & Li Fenghua, Lun Woguo Zhixing Chenxu Zhong de Canyu Fenpei 
Zhidu ( 我国执 序中 参与分 制度 ) [Fair Distribution in Judgment 
Executions in China], 191 Shandong Shenpan (山东审判) [SHANDONG JUST.] 54, 56 
(2009). See also Shuangling Tang, Shilun Minshi Zhixing Canyu Fenpei Zhidu (
事执 参与分 制度) [The Fair Distribution Regime in Judgment Execution], 25 
Xinjiang Guangbo Dianshi Daxue Xuebao ( 广播 大学学报) [J. XINJIANG 
RTVU] 57, 59 (2004).  
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Execution officers carry out their jobs independently from each 
other and from court to court. The isolation of one execution from 
another against the same debtor makes fair distribution a rare event. 
Moreover, execution officers also have no incentive to see fair 
distribution take place, since whether the execution claim can be 
realised or not will not affect their personal performance assessment, 
suggesting there is no relation between promotions and bonuses of 
individual execution officers and execution outcomes. 88 As a result, 
execution officers may never proactively seek communication with 
other courts to increase the likelihood of fair distribution.  
However, the benefit of the lack of personal incentives regarding 
the execution recovery rate is also obvious. When a fair distribution 
request is received from a fellow court, three interviewed execution 
officers admitted that they tend to entertain such a request, especially 
the request from a nearby court with which they have friendly 
relationships.89 But one thing is certain: commencing a fair distribution 
procedure is not what execution officers proactively seek, and this must 
be, procedurally and substantially, activated by joining execution 
creditors themselves.  
The second reason hampering the use of fair distribution would 
be that many execution procedures are commenced too late. When the 
e ec i  ffice  ie   ea ch f  he deb  a e  i  ch ca e , he 
 
88 It is confusing since many journal articles suggest that execution officers in China 
are still assessed based on execution recovery rates, but when interviewing execution 
officers in this court and in the city in May 2017, the author was told that execution 
recovery rates did not affect their internal performance assessment. Further 
investigation is needed. See Guanyu Kaizhan Anjian Zhiliang Pinggu Gongzuo de 
Zhidao Yijian  (Shixing) (关于开展 件 估工作 指导意 ( )) 
[Guidance on Court and Judge Performance Assessment (For Trial Implementation)], 
( ga ed b  he S . Pe e  C ., Jan. 11, 2008), art. 10 (requiring that judgment 
execution recovery rates should be one of the court performance assessment criteria in 
China); see also Zhang Yonghong (张 ), Zhixing Biaodi Daoweilü de Zhong Ying 
Bijiao yu Sikao (执 到位 中 与思 ) [Judgment Execution 
Recovery Rates: A Comparison between China and England], 28 Renmin Sifa (人
司 ) [PEOPLE S JUDICATURE] 105, 105 (2016)  (noting that judgment execution 
recovery rates are still a significant factor for court performance assessment in China); 
see also Liu Jianzhou & Zhang Wei, Huifu Zhixing Anjian Canyu Fenpei de Chuli (
恢复执 件参与分 处 ) [Fair Distribution in Resumed Judgment 
Executions], 18 Renmin Sifa (人 司 ) [PEOPLE S JUDICATURE] 52, 53 (2011) 
(noting that judgment execution recovery rates are a soft assessment criterion for 
execution officers and courts). 
89 Interview 2017-3 (May 7, 2017); Interview 2017-4 (May 8, 2017); Interview 2017-
5 (May 5, 2017). 
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officer will often discover that other courts have already taken earlier 
actions and that no assets are left. In fact, as to whether it is too late, it 
is a relative judgment and appears in two ways.  
The first is that, from the point of view of the execution creditor 
in this court, the execution action was behind others. One example is the 
execution against Xingming Ratchets Manufacturing Limited. In 2014, 
at the request of the execution creditor, Ping An Bank Limited, this court 
k ac i  a d ea ched f  Xi g i g  a e , a d  i i g , 
nothing was found; however, months before in 2013, another court 
successfully seized several cars owned by Xingming so as to make that 
execution claim at least partially paid. From the perspective of the 
execution creditor, Ping An, in this court, apparently the disappointment 
was mainly caused by the action being commenced too late. With the 
benefit of hindsight, if Ping An had sued the debtor several months 
earlier and had taken the execution action accordingly, at least it could 
have received something rather than nothing. But it is worth noting that 
Ping An was not the only victim, since around 2014 there were at least 
27 completely failed execution efforts against Xingming.  
The second is that the execution creditor in this court is relatively 
better off than other creditors on the grounds that at least part of its 
execution claim has been met. Alternatively, actions of other execution 
creditors taken months, if not years, later obtained nothing. In this 
situation, the victims are those taking action after the execution creditor 
in this court has received a judgment.  
An example is useful to explain this phenomenon. The debtor 
company He San Environment Technology Engineering Limited was 
chased by this court in 2014 to pay the execution claim of RMB 
309,919.49 (US$ 46,209.67) in the interest of the execution creditor 
Guwei Erosion Engineering Limited, and finally only RMB 99,541.00 
(US$ 14,841.80) of the claim was met, suggesting a 32.12 per cent 
repayment rate. However, in 2015, another creditor Liangchen Facility 
Engineering Limited won a lawsuit against He San for a judgment debt 
of RMB 1,700,000.00 (US$ 253,307.89) but recovered only in the 
subsequent execution procedure. From the perspective of Liangchen, 
ironically Guwei was an early-bird creditor.  
To some extent, the second reason might be one of the symptoms 
of the first reason concerning the lack of communication between 
different execution courts. Again, it is worth reemphasizing that 
judgment execution is not designed to coordinate with other peer 
executions and that expecting execution to adequately fulfil the role of 
bankruptcy is largely unrealistic.   
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The third reason for the scarcity of fair distribution is the 
bureaucracy of conducting fair distribution by courts of law. Under 
Article 91 of the 1998 judicial notice, for the joining execution creditor, 
the fair distribution request must be sent by its own execution court to 
the execution court disposing of the seized assets; the joining creditor is 
not allowed to apply directly to the distributing court. This Article is 
vigorously complied with in practice. One interviewed execution officer 
stated that a fellow execution court must make the fair distribution 
request, and that the application from an execution creditor is 
illegitimate and will be simply ignored, indicating that it is business 
between courts rather than between court and execution party.90 This 
hurdle, it seems, cannot be logically justified; the joining creditor has a 
direct interest in the prospective fair distribution operation. Why is a 
straightforward application not permitted?  
Another senior execution officer added that, apart from a written 
fair distribution request, the requesting court should also send the final 
judgment proving that the joining creditor has won the case.91 This is 
also corroborated by an interviewed lawyer who lamented that the fair 
distribution application is treated as non-existent by the distributing 
execution officer if the final judgement is not provided,92 which means 
that the creditor will be excluded if its litigation against the debtor is 
still ongoing. This suggests that Article 90 of the 1998 judicial notice, 
which requires that the joining creditor has to provide a final judgment 
and has initiated an execution procedure, is strictly followed in practice. 
This may appear overly tough for those creditors who have not taken 
timely action. The upside of such a system is it provides arguably greater 
efficiency and certainty, but sacrifices fairness to do so. 
A successful fair distribution effort must jump through two 
hoops. The first is that the joining creditor must persuade its own 
execution officer to send the request. The second requirement is that the 
joining creditor can only pray for its acceptance by the distributing court. 
Going through these two hoops is fraught with uncertainty.  
One interviewed lawyer said that he is always worried about 
whether his own execution officer will end up sending the fair 
distribution request, and whether the requested court will accept it, since 
execution officers have considerable latitude and there are no specific 
rules to hold execution officers to account.93 Many interviewed lawyers 
 
90 Interview 2017-2 (May 10, 2017).  
91 Interview 2017-5 (May 5, 2017).  
92 Interview 2017-13 (May 5, 2017).  
93 Interview 2017-12 (May 7, 2017).  
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expressed similar worries. 94  However, such anxiety seems to be 
unfounded, since the fact is that most interviewed lawyers have 
successfully initiated the fair distribution procedure and made it a reality. 
There was only one interviewed lawyer offering his one failed attempt 
in which hi  c ie  fai  di ib i  a ica i  a  ejec ed b  i   
execution officer on the basis that the judgment creditor was not the 
original creditor of the debtor and purchased the debt; although such 
fact was irrelevant to the legality of the judgment and of the fair 
distribution application, it was still arbitrarily refused. This lawyer 
c ai ed ha  i ce he e ec i  ffice  deci i  a  gi e  
verbally, there was no formal order in writing, which meant that there 
was no appeal or review and that there was no legal remedy.95  
But it must be remembered that such a failed attempt is rare, and 
in most cases execution officers tend to entertain such an application. It 
is equally true that whether fair distribution can be carried out is almost 
entirely at the hands of execution officers and that the voices of 
execution creditors are considerably weaker. One lawyer asserted that 
despite the lack of legal remedies under the existing rules, she never 
hesitates to urge her client to lodge a general complaint against the 
execution officer personally if a fair distribution application is 
unreasonably rejected, indicating that taking revenge is the only 
option.96   
However, it would be unfair to accuse execution officers of 
being rogue players. Instead, it seems that they are somewhat lenient in 
assessing fair distribution applications. One key question asked is 
whether the joining execution creditor must convince the distributing 
court that the execution debtor, as required by Article 96 of the 1998 
judicial notice, had been officially closed, deregistered or stopped 
e a i  a d ha  he e ec i  deb  a e  e e  e gh  ee  
its liabilities. To this question, all interviewed execution officers 
unequivocally replied that they had never asked creditors to provide 
such evidence, because it was impractical for them to produce and 
because it was a plain fact that the execution debtor did not have 
sufficient assets to meet the judgment debts, let alone all of its debts.97 
One execution officer said that in practice the execution court tends to 
broadly interpret Article 96 of the 1998 judicial notice and to 
 
94 Interview 2017-13 (May 5, 2017); Interview 2017-9 (May 7, 2017); Interview 2017-
8 (May 9, 2017); Interview 2017-6 (May 10, 2017).  
95 Interview 2017-14 (May 5, 2017).  
96 Interview 2017-9 (May 7, 2017).  
97 Interview 2017-5 (May 5, 2017); Interview 2017-2 (May 10, 2017); Interview 2017-
1 (May 11, 2017); Interview 2017-3 (May 7, 2017); Interview 2017-4 (May 8, 2017).  
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automatically accept fair distribution requests from fellow courts.98 In 
fact, Article 96 of the 1998 judicial notice, which requires the joining 
creditor to prove the execution debtor has been officially closed, 
deregistered or stopped business operation, in addition to the fact that 
he deb  a e  ca  ee  i  e i e iabi i ie , i  ag a ica  
ignored by execution officers, though it is politically incorrect for the 
interviewed to frankly say so. This also suggests that many academic 
debates on this issue in China seems to be out of touch with reality.99 
Overall, the lack of communication between executions is the 
main factor hindering the use of fair distribution. The bureaucracy of 
the fair distribution procedure compounds its scarcity. Although fair 
distribution is expected to offer some degree of fairness, compared to 
all-inclusive bankruptcy procedures, its weaknesses are fully exposed. 
 
D. MAJOR FLAWS OF THE USE OF FAIR DISTRIBUTION 
 
Fi , he e i  a e  i i ed a ge f he deb  a e  ha  ca  
be subject to fair distribution. To a large extent, the only asset that can 
be used for fair distribution appears to be real property. In 14 out of 
he e 15 fai  di ib i  e e , i  i  he deb  b i di g a d he 
affiliated land use rights that were realised by the court and shared by 
participating creditors. In only one of these 14 fair distribution cases, 
which was against the debtor, Yadi Science and Technology Limited, 
a a  f  e i g he deb  a  a d a d, e ehic e f he 
company was also seized and auctioned. Except buildings and land, 
generally speaking, it seems that no other assets can be covered by fair 
distribution, which considerably undermines its effectiveness. Of these 
15 fair distribution events, there is only one case in which it is not real 
property, but cash, used to meet the fair distribution demands.  
The key reason for this would be that, on one hand, buildings 
and land are the most visible, in both physical and legal terms, and on 
he he  ha d, c a ed  he c a  he  a e , i  i  fa  e 
diffic  f  he deb ,  he e e f he c a  ba k c ,  
secretly transfer these assets out of the sights of creditors. For the most 
liquid asset, bank deposits, presumably, long before the execution 
actions, the debtor has already hid the deposits in secret locations so as 
 
98 Interview 2017-4 (May 8, 2017).  
99 See Xingquan Cao & Yanqing Shang, Minshi Zhixing Zhong Canyu Fenpei Chenxu 
de Shiyun Tiaojian ( 事执 中参与分 序 件) [An Examination of the 
Conditions for Fair Distribution in Judgment Executions], 5 Zhenfa Luncong (政
丛) [J. POL. SCI. & L.] 73, 75 (2017).  
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to evade responsibilities. A senior lawyer interviewee corroborated this 
idea, b e i g ha  i   ca e  he c a  c i g 
shareholders tend to move as many moveable assets away as possible. 
As a result, when creditors take legal action, the only assets left are more 
likely to be real property because transferring the ownership of such 
assets always involves government registration and official 
confirmation and is not easily abused by unscrupulous businessmen.100 
Such business malpractice is frequently reported in China, but Chinese 
state institutions, including law courts, it seems, are unable, or unwilling 
to, effectively tackle them.101  
Practice suggests that some bankrupt execution debtors may 
have another valuable source of assets, which cannot be easily reached 
b  b h e ec i  ffice  a d c edi . The e a e  a e he deb  
uncollected receivables of its debtors. If these assets can be collected, 
the effectiveness of fair distribution would be considerably enhanced. 
For execution officers, since they are not bankruptcy trustees, they do 
not  and are not required to  f  i e iga e he deb  a e  b  
examining the company books, meaning they have little information 
about these assets. One senior lawyer discussed the bankruptcy case of 
a local paper-manufacturing company in which he was involved and the 
bankruptcy trustee finally recovered the receivables worth around RMB 
30,000,000.00 (US$ 4,460,502.00), increasing the unsecured debt 
recovery rate to 18%. He stated that if there had not been a bankruptcy 
procedure, it would have been impossible for the creditors to benefit 
from such assets.102  
For execution creditors, as noted above, it is largely unrealistic 
for them to access information regardi g he deb  ecei ab e . 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely for creditors to inform execution officers 
to seize them in order to widen the base of fair distribution. However, 
in exceptional circumstances, some creditors having inside information 
on the deb  ecei ab e , a  a  e ed ea ie  i  he Li H i Jia ca e, 
do take advantage of the secretly acquired information and, ironically, 
avoid fair distribution.  
 
100 Interview 2017-13 (May 5, 2017).  
101 See Fran Wang, P2P Bosses Warned: Don t Take the Mone  and Run, CAIXIN (July 
18, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-07-18/p2p-bosses-warned-dont-take-
the-money-and-run-101306130.html; see also Wang Xinxin, Pochan Fa Ke Chenwei 
Zui Qiang Youli de Qiye Zhenjiu Fa ( 产 可成为 强 力 企业拯救 ) 
[Bankruptcy Law Would be the Most Powerful Company Rehabilitation Law], 
Guangming Ribao (光 报) [GUANGMING DAILY], June 15, 2017, at 15 (arguing 
that effectively implementing bankruptcy law could curb such business malpractice).  
102 Interview 2017-13 (May 5, 2017).  
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Second, mainly due to the lack of information disclosure and of 
effective communication between execution courts, the number of 
execution creditors able to join fair distribution is also very limited. It 
was argued earlier that it might be unfair since fair distribution is only 
available for creditors that have won the case and have initiated 
judgment executions, but in reality, only some of these diligent creditors 
can join, suggesting that the reality is far more unfair than envisaged. 
From the standpoint of execution creditors in this court, as shown in 
Table 1, at least in five fair distribution events against the execution 
debtors Wang Yi, Jianzhen, Shanda, Chuanzhong and Yadi carried out 
in other courts, the execution creditors from this court did not or were 
unable to join.  
Worse, these execution creditors from this court were not the 
only victims; instead, there are far more victims, and it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that being an outsider to the fair distribution process 
seems to be the norm rather than the exception in many cases. For 
example, the fair distribution scheme against Wang Yi Tourism 
Development Limited was conducted in 2015 by the Nanping 
Intermediate People' Court, Fujian Province, and the execution creditor 
Ronghua Financial Leasing Limited from this court was not able to 
participate in it. But in fact, as reported by the China Judgment Online, 
there are at least 11 more execution creditors commencing executions 
in 2016 and 2017 who missed the chance and got nothing.103  
In other words, as for fair distribution beneficiaries, only some 
execution creditors are actually able to join, and some, if not most, 
execution creditors remain excluded for various reasons. Of course, fair 
distribution is both out of reach and out of sight for the creditors who 
did not take legal action and who did take action but have not obtained 
a final judgment prior to the commencement of fair distribution. Namely, 
the effect of fair distribution is far more limited than anticipated.   
The reaction of commercial lawyers to the fact that only a 
limited number of execution creditors can join fair distribution is mixed. 
O e a e  aid ha  I be ie e fai  di ib i   e   e ec i  
creditors is fair, since if you (the creditors that did not take legal action) 
do not actively take action to claim your own debts in a timely manner, 
how ca   e ec  he   k af e   i e e ? 104 The second 
a e  a ea ed  be e a i a  a d c e ed ha  ab e 
fairness is difficult to reach and fair distribution only for the benefits of 
 
103 Wang Yi Tourism Development Limited ( 亿 发展 公司), THE CHINA 
JUDGMENT (EXECUTION) ONLINE, http://zxgk.court.gov.cn/shixin/. 
104 Interview 2017-11 (May 7, 2017).  
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a limited number of execution creditors is fair,  addi g ha  if he 
creditor who has sued the debtor but has not obtained a final judgment 
is allowed to join, it will give rise to some uncertainties, since on the 
one hand, it is unknown whether the litigating creditor can finally win 
the case in the near future, and on the other, the whole execution 
procedure will be delayed.105 
The third lawyer responded that if the execution debtor is still 
solvent, having fair distribution only be available for even a limited 
number of execution creditors would be fair, but if insolvent, it is 
ab e  fai . H e e , he add e ed ha  i  ac ice I ha e e e  
seen the solvency of an execution debtor when fair distribution was 
ed. 106 The f h a e  a ed ha  fai  di ib i  i  fa  f a 
limited number of execution creditors is relatively fair, and to achieve 
ultimate fairness opening a formal bankruptcy procedure is the only 
i . 107 
The fifth lawyer made the most insightful comment, asserting 
that if a formal bankruptcy procedure were opened, three key issues 
could be immediately solved. First, all creditors, including execution 
creditors and their peers that have not taken legal action, would be 
equally protected, which would categorically eliminate the unfairness 
arising from the use of fair distribution. Second, for execution courts, 
any repeated executions against the company could be avoided, which 
would prevent judicial resources from being wasted. Third, employees 
would be better protected, because employee entitlements are given 
priority in a formal bankruptcy procedure.108 
Overall, all interviewed lawyers agree that the limited fairness 
gleaned from fair distribution is better than the entire deprivation of 
fairness due to the absence of both fair distribution and bankruptcy, and 
that the real scourge of the current situation is the ineffective 
implementation of the formal bankruptcy law in China.109  
In addition, many fair distribution events raise concerns about 
transparency, mainly as a result of the skeletal nature of the rules in the 
1998 judicial notice regulating fair distribution.110 The most complained 
of issue is the way the final fair distribution plan is made.  Many 
interviewed lawyers said that the plan was made by the execution officer 
 
105 Interview 2017-9 (May 7, 2017).  
106 Interview 2017-12 (May 7, 2017).  
107 Interview 2017-14 (May 5, 2017).  
108 Interview 2017-11 (May 7, 2017).  
109 Interview 2017-14 (May 5, 2017); Interview 2017-8 (May 9, 2017); Interview 
2017-12 (May 7, 2017). 
110 See generally Wu, supra note 67, at 115.  
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behind closed doors, and that, for joining execution creditors, they had 
no option but to accept what was offered.111  
This would be mainly because Article 94 of the 1998 judicial 
notice only states that when fair distribution applies, after fully meeting 
the claims of securities, if any, all unsecured execution creditors will 
share what is left under the pari passu principle, without clarifying 
whether the distribution plan should get the consent of participating 
creditors or whether execution creditors, if unsatisfied, could lodge an 
appeal or review motion.  
H e e , he a e  c ai  ab  he ack f a a e c  
should be treated with caution, because in the course of fieldwork, the 
author was given by two execution officers hard copies of two fair 
distribution plans which clearly show that all participating execution 
creditors that signed on the file not only complied with pari passu but 
also agreed in advance on the distributing plan. Moreover, at least the 
four fair distribution events against the execution debtors Wang Yi, 
Keheng, Wester, and Hangda (included in Table 1) demonstrate that pari 
passu was well respected. Therefore, to a large extent, the substantial 
rights of participating creditors are protected, although execution 
officers should do much more to better inform joining creditors.  
Obviously, some execution officers behave very well when it 
comes to transparency and respecting creditors. One senior execution 
officer said that he usually exercises his discretion by convening a 
meeting of all participating creditors in which they would be well 
informed of the distribution plan, although the law does not explicitly 
require him to do so.112 One lawyer echoed this perspective, saying that 
some responsible execution officers hold a meeting of execution 
creditors before the distributing plan is finalised.113 However at least 
two interviewees insisted that the execution officer made the 
distribution plan without consulting execution creditors in advance.114 
A g ab , he a big i  f he e  a d e ec i  ffice  e a  
preference more or less upset many lawyers.  
In particular, lawyers are perhaps unhappy with the lack of 
transparency for two reasons. First, several execution officers clarified 
that if a fair distribution request was straightforwardly made by the 
creditor that had not finished the lawsuit and had not obtained a final 
 
111 Interview 2017-6 (May 10, 2017); Interview 2017-7 (May 9, 2017); Interview 
2017-11 (May 7, 2017).  
112 Interview 2017-4 (May 8, 2017).  
113 Interview 2017-6 (May 10, 2017).  
114 Id.; Interview 2017-14 (May 5, 2017).  
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judgment, the request would be definitely dismissed but without giving 
any written response.115 This may irritate lawyers since it makes it more 
difficult for clients to claim their rights, resulting in resentment. Second, 
what may further irk lawyers is the question of how to decide the 
deadline for a legitimate fair distribution request to arrive at the 
distributing execution court, because Article 90 of the 1998 judicial 
notice vaguely states that the fair distribution request should be received 
before the end of the execution action on the seized assets. This does 
not specify whether the end of the execution is when the assets were 
seized or sold or when the proceeds were handed to other execution 
creditors.  
Two execution officers stated that in their province the deadline 
is, according to a memorandum of its provincial supreme court, set up 
at the point when the fair distribution plan was made, which means that 
the execution creditors whose fair distribution requests arrived after that 
would not be allowed to join and to share the proceeds.116 But one senior 
lawyer disputed that in practice this deadline is very easy to be 
manipulated, because if the distributing execution officer is well bribed, 
he could silently postpone the making of the final distribution plan and 
give plenty of time for the bribing execution creditor to comfortably join 
fair distribution; this lawyer was vocal and said that there are too many 
chances for execution officers to take bribery.117 
After all, fair distribution is problematic in nature, so its flawed 
implementation should surprise no one. At its maximum, it only fills the 
gap left by the almost absence of bankruptcy law in China 11 per cent 
 
115 Interview 2017-4 (May 8, 2017); Interview 2017-2 (May 10, 2017); Interview 
2017-1 (May 11, 2017). A provincial supreme court also reiterates this in its judicial 
note guiding the courts under its jurisdiction. See [Guidance on Multiple Execution 
Creditors against the Common Execution Debtor (2012-5), art. 6] (promulgated by the 
ABC (anonymized name) Provincial Sup. Pe e  C .). 
116 Interview 2017-4 (May 8, 2017); Interview 2017-3 (May 7, 2017).  
117 Interview 2017-13 (May 5, 2017). For an insightful discussi   Chi a  j dicia  
corruption, see Chenglin Liu, Risks Faced by Foreign Lawyers in China, 35 ARIZ. J. 
INT L & COMP. L. 131, 153 55 (2018). See generally Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: 
Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years, 20 NW. J. INT L L. & BUS. 383 (2000). In 
ece  ea , he e e e  de  e ide  f he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  
arrested and convicted on corruption, and these two corruption cases are largely the 
tip of an iceberg. See, e.g., Life Sentence Upheld for China Supreme Court Judge, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Mar. 18, 2010 (reporting the conviction of Justice Mr. 
H a g S g , he de  e ide  f he Chi a S e e Pe e  C ,  
corruption in 2010 in China); Sui-Lee Wee, China to Prosecute Former Senior Judge 
for Corruption  Watchdog, REUTERS, Sept. 29, 2015 (reporting the criminal trial of 
J ice M . Xi Xia i g, he de  e ide  f he Chi a S e e Pe e  C , 
in 2015).  
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of the time, suggesting that it fails to adequately serve as a bankruptcy 
law substitute. But the abrupt abolition of fair distribution in judgment 
execution against legal person enterprises in 2015 did upset the legal 
communities, especially commercial lawyers. The following section 
discusses whether abolition is fit for the purpose of increasing 
execution-to-bankruptcy conversions and how execution creditors seek 
fairness afterwards.  
 
IV. ABOLISHING FAIR DISTRIBUTION LEADS TO THE INCREASING 
USE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, DOESN T IT? 
 
By closing the fair distribution regime in judgment execution 
agai  c a  deb , he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  ai   
force the execution creditor that takes action behind its fellow creditor(s) 
to file for the bankruptcy of the execution debtor, expecting that more 
bankruptcy applications will lead to more bankruptcy cases. However, 
this effect does not seem to be as pronounced as expected.  
Table 2 below demonstrates three columns of figures: the first is 
the numbers of corporate bankruptcies accepted by this court and by its 
14 subordinate county/district courts during the period from 1 June 2007, 
a time when the EBL 2006 took effect, to 31 December 2016, a time 
shortly before the fieldwork of this study was conducted; over the period 
of almost ten years (nine years and seven months exactly), 15 courts 
accepted 304 corporate bankruptcy filings, and on average one court 
handled about two corporate bankruptcies a year, which is not much.  
In Table 2, the second column of figures shows the successful 
execution-to-bankruptcy conversions taking place in this court and in its 
14 subordinate courts during the whole of 2016 following the abolition 
of fair distribution in 2015. Ironically, in this court, there was only one 
execution-to-bankruptcy conversion, and in the five inferior courts no 
execution-to-bankruptcy conversion occurred in 2016 at all. The overall 
picture is fairly bleak. The third column is the execution-to-bankruptcy 
conversions happening in the first quarter of 2017, the latest data on this 
issue, and in nine of the 15 courts, there was, unfortunately, no 
execution-to-bankruptcy conversion at the beginning of 2017. 
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Court 
Corporate 
Bankruptcies 
Accepted  
(1 Jun 2007 – 
31 Dec 2016) 
Execution-
to-
Bankruptcy 
Conversions 
(1 Jan 2016 – 
31 Dec 2016) 
Execution-
to-
Bankruptcy 
Conversions 
(the First 
Quarter of 
2017) 
This Court 75 1 0 
Subordinate 
County Court 1 4 1 0 
Subordinate 
County Court 2 3 2 0 
Subordinate 
County Court 3 6 2 1 
Subordinate 
County Court 4  16 1 1 
Subordinate 
County Court 5  7 0 0 
Subordinate 
County Court 6 9 0 0 
Subordinate 
County Court 7  62 0 7 
Subordinate 
County Court 8  3 1 0 
Subordinate 
County Court 9 33 9 3 
Subordinate 
County Court 10  7 1 1 
Subordinate 
County Court 11 42 2 4 
Subordinate 
County Court 12  32 9 0 
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Subordinate 
County Court 13 4 0 0 
Subordinate 
County Court 14  1 0 0 
In Total  304 29 17 
Table 2 Execution-to-Bankruptcy Conversions in the Surveyed Court after 2015 
S ce: The A h  Da a C ec i  f  he C  E ec i  Cha be  
 
These figures suggest that execution-to-bankruptcy conversion 
is a rare phenomenon, at least in this city, since overall the total number 
of such conversions is negligible. Specifically, in this court, if the 2014 
number of execution-to-bankruptcy candidate companies can be 
extrapolated to the year 2016, and if the new regime can be fully 
implemented, there should have been, at the very least, 136 corporate 
bankruptcy cases converted from previous judgment executions; 
however, there was only one case (0.74%), demonstrating that there is 
something seriously wrong with the current regime. In fact, the reality 
in this city is also echoed by the national picture of the numbers of 
corporate bankruptcy cases, as mentioned in the introduction.  
To further test this notion, one question over whether execution-
to-bankruptcy conversion is easier than before was asked to the 
interviewees. One senior lawyer observed that there was no substantial 
change after 2015. Although some county courts in his city tried to 
promote its use,118 which is true: the county courts 9 and 12 in this city 
(included in Table 2) accepted nine execution-to-bankruptcy 
conversions each in 2016, this lawyer further lamented that his team 
advised their clients to apply for execution-to-bankruptcy several times, 
but all were arbitrarily rejected.119 
The other three lawyers gave the same answer: they had not 
observed any real differences since the 2015 judicial notice took 
effect, 120  which means that commencing a corporate bankruptcy 
procedure in court is as difficult as before. Another senior lawyer said 
that it is supposed to be easier than before but he had not heard any real 
occurrence of execution-to-bankruptcy conversions, adding that 
sometimes some junior lawyers in his firm submitted corporate 
 
118 Interview 2017-14 (May 5, 2017).  
119 Id.  
120 Interview 2017-9 (May 7, 2017); Interview 2017-8 (May 9, 2017); Interview 2017-
12 (May 7, 2017).  
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bankruptcy applications to courts but all were declined verbally.121 This 
suggests that courts avoid accountability by not giving any written 
evidence proving that the application was officially made.  
Compared with commercial lawyers, execution officers are 
repeat players and may have more insightful observations. One senior 
e ec i  ffice  f  hi  c  aid ha   i   ( he  he 
interview was conducted in May 2017), none of the judgment 
executions handled by myself has been converted into bankruptcy 
ced e . 122  This execution officer dealt with 91 judgment 
executions in 2014, and the whole court had 876 executions in total, as 
noted earlier. An execution officer from subordinate court 4 (included 
in Table 2) shook his head when asked whether it was easier than before, 
explaining that it may take longer for the new regime to be fully studied 
by the court system and to be adequately implemented.123 
The director of the execution chamber of the subordinate court 
3 (included in Table 5) recalled that he had been working in his court 
for almost 20 years since 1998 and only knew of one execution-to-
bankruptcy conversion case in his court, but he remained less 
pessimistic, saying that since the middle of 2016 such conversions 
became relatively easier than before and his chamber did send two such 
requests to other fellow courts for consideration, both of which were 
successful.124 In other words, there was progress made, but the problem 
is that the progress is too little to make a real difference.  
The key reason for the rare use of execution-to-bankruptcy 
conversion would, as was pointed out by an execution officer,125 be that 
the requested court tends to simply decline the request by remaining 
silent. This is exactly what was worried about regarding Article 514 of 
the 2015 judicial notice, since it failed to add a clause to hold the 
requested court to account. In many cases, the requested court is actually 
the same court as the execution court, namely the potential conversion 
happens between the execution chamber and the second civil chamber, 
with the latter in charge of corporate bankruptcies.  
One execution officer explained that, from the perspective of the 
execution chamber, all executions against bankrupt companies should 
be, in principle and under the current law, handed to the second civil 
chamber to open a formal corporate bankruptcy procedure, but the key 
 
121 Interview 2017-7 (May 9, 2017).  
122 Interview 2017-5 (May 5, 2017).  
123 Interview 2017-1 (May 11, 2017).  
124 Interview 2017-2 (May 10, 2017).  
125 Id.  
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problem is that the second civil chamber refuses to accept, which is a 
deadlock within the court system itself.126 To a large extent, this is an 
old, rather than new, problem: the hesitation of law courts in accepting 
corporate bankruptcy filings is the issue.  
Unable to enter into a formal corporate bankruptcy procedure, 
under Article 516 of the 2015 judicial notice, the execution creditors 
must be paid on a first come, first served basis. One lawyer was still 
excited, when interviewed, saying that his client unexpectedly received 
the execution payment of RMB 13,000,000.00 (US$ 1,929,040.88) 
recently in an execution case, where there was a surplus after the 
ec i  a  f  e  f i g a  a c i  f he deb  a e , i ce 
his client was the first party to place the asset freezing order on the 
deb  ea  e , a bei  ia he e ec i  ffice . Thi  a e  c d 
not stop his excitement and gloated that there were seven execution 
creditors queuing behind who were paid nothing and were very upset 
but could do nothing, because they were unable to commence a 
bankruptcy procedure. 127  This lawyer continued to boast about this 
serendipitous result, saying that the senior managers of his client, a bank, 
were shocked but happy when told of this outcome.128  
Regarding the abolition of fair distribution and the reversal to 
the first come, first in right principle, the interviewed lawyers opposed 
it in near-unison: at least three interviewed lawyers condemned that it is 
ab e  ea ab e f  he Chi a S e e Pe e  C   d  
so.129 One managing partner of a local big law firm commented with 
composure that the intent of the China Supreme Pe e  C  i   
promote more execution-to-bankruptcy conversions and this is 
understandable, but given that such conversions could not get support 
from courts in practice, the real consequence is to switch back to the 
first-past-the-post norm. This is in effect a step backwards and backfires, 
reflecting the misjudgement of the decision makers at the China 
S e e Pe e  C .130  
One lawyer asserted that the practical ramification of this is that 
the new regime encourages creditors to sue the debtor and to sue fast at 
he fi  igh  f he deb  e abi i , hich a  e edi e 
company failures, and he could not understand why the China Supreme 
 
126 Id.  
127 Interview 2017-16 (May 6, 2017).  
128 Id,  
129 Interview 2017-12 (May 7, 2017); Interview 2017-8 (May 9, 2019); Interview 
2017-13 (May 5, 2017).  
130 Interview 2017-14 (May 5, 2017).  
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Pe e  C  i   f ch  ch a deg ee ha  i  i  i  
exacerbating unfairness.131 
One execution officer recounted an execution procedure in 
which he applied the first come, first in right principle by distributing 
the execution proceeds to the execution creditor that took the first action, 
and received many bitter responses from the lawyers who represented 
the execution creditors queuing behind, because they could not open a 
bankruptcy procedure for the execution debtor, although the law gives 
them such a right. This senior execution officer, who was approaching 
his retirement when interviewed, said that he could only pacify the 
di g ed a e  b  a i g ha  e  i e,  i  bec e a 
beneficiary if you represent an execution creditor that takes action by 
fi  aci g a  a e  f ee i g de .  H e e , he c fe ed ha  gi e  
that it is impractical to materialise execution-to-bankruptcy conversion, 
the old practice, fair distribution, is relatively fairer.132   
A he  e ec i  ffice  ad i ed ha  i g he f a  
bankruptcy procedure is, everyone knows, the best option, but since it 
is very unlikely to open a bankruptcy procedure, given the denial of the 
bankruptcy procedure, fair distribution under the previous judicial 
ice i  defi i e  e  e i .  B  he a ici a ed ha  a  ea  i  he fi e 
years to come, I remain sceptical (about the effective use of execution-
to-ba k c  c e i ). 133 
However, although the 2015 judicial notice revoked fair 
distribution, at least in this court it is still occasionally used, probably to 
pragmatically solve the related social stability troubles arising from the 
bitterness of some execution creditors.   
In 2017, the execution chamber of this court auctioned the assets, 
the shares at a large local company, of the execution debtor Nenhua Oil 
Industry Limited, 134  and realised RMB 15,800,000.00 
(US$ 2,344,526.00). On March 20, 2017, there were another two 
execution creditors whose executions were handled in court 2 (included 
in Table 2) and lodged a written request to this court asking for an 
execution-to-bankruptcy conversion. Actually, before asking this court 
for a bankruptcy request, these two execution creditors had already filed 
for the bankruptcy of the debtor in court 2 under which jurisdiction the 
debtor was domiciled; as anticipated, there was no response from court 
2.  
 
131 Interview 2017-8 (May 9, 2017).  
132 Interview 2017-5 (May 5, 2017).  
133 Interview 2017-2 (May 10, 2017).  
134 All parties are under the assumed names for anonymity.  
216 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW [Vol. 33:172 
 
 
It is unknown what happened behind the scenes. Most likely 
because of a protest or a bribery, the court organised a fair distribution 
settlement between the three execution creditors, each of them paid 56 
cents on the yuan; the execution creditor Chenchang Asset Management 
Limited in this court was paid RMB 9,017,041.35 (US$ 1,338,018.00), 
and the two execution creditors from court 2 were paid RMB 
4,723,761.81 (US$ 700,948.00) and RMB 1,789,572.34 
(US$ 265,550.00) respectively. It was a peaceful end for these three 
creditors.  
But the China Judgment Online shows that there were at least 
another 11 failed execution procedures against Nenhua Oil Industry 
Limited, and unfortunately the execution creditors in those cases were 
unable to join the fair distribution event conducted in this court and they 
probably did not even know what took place in this court. Again, the 
lack of communication almost paralyses fair distribution.  
Obviously, further research is needed to investigate the extent to 
which the old fair distribution regime is still used in practice. What this 
study reveals is that the fair distribution regime is still alive, despite the 
fact that it was officially terminated. One interviewed lawyer disclosed 
that some of his execution officer friends told him that many courts tend 
to ignore the abolition of fair distribution and to continue to apply it, 
because the new regime creates more troubles.135  
After all, the fair distribution regime has been formally 
abolished, but it is still used because it can pragmatically solve 
unfairness problems. Unless and until the corporate bankruptcy law in 
China can be fully implemented, the judicial response to its abolition 
may continue to be mixed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the data collected and presented in this article, it seems 
clear that fair distribution in judgment execution is not effective in 
filling the gap left by the inefficient implementation of the corporate 
bankruptcy law in China. It can be tentatively concluded that fair 
distribution as a bankruptcy substitute with Chinese characteristics is 
largely a failure. It is no exaggeration to say that the fair distribution 
regime was never a real alternative to the EBL 2006 and its predecessors 
before and after its official abolition in 2015.  
Apart from the aforementioned major discovery, there are at 
least another five key findings of this study worth summarising here. 
 
135 Interview 2017-13 (May 5, 2017).  
2019]  THE CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY SUBSTITUTE 217 
 
 
Fi , i   ea  fai  di ib i  e e , i  i   he deb  ea  
property that can be seized for distribution, which considerably 
undermines the effectiveness of this regime.136 Second, the data reveals 
that the inclusiveness of fair distribution is far worse than feared, since 
while some may have worried that only execution creditors rather than 
creditors as a whole would benefit, 137 the reality is that even many 
execution creditors miss the chance and are unable to join the 
distribution, meaning that not all execution creditors benefit from this 
regime.  
Third, many execution officers are actually very lenient and 
broadly interpret the conditions of fair distribution; in particular, 
execution officers in practice do not need fair distribution applicants to 
prove that the execution debtor is closed, deregistered or has terminated 
business operation without going through a formal bankruptcy 
procedure and that the debtor is balance-sheet bankrupt. It is hardly a 
stretch to say that execution officers have, in effect, abandoned this 
official condition in practice, which suggests that the many academic 
debates on this topic are out of touch with reality and are a waste of time.  
Fourth, a h gh he Chi a S e e Pe e  C  e i a ed 
the use of fair distribution in judgment executions against company 
debtors in 2015, because of the insurmountable barriers of opening a 
formal bankruptcy procedure, fair distribution continues, though less 
often, to be used to solve practical troubles in China.138  
Fif h, i  i  he c  he i a i , a he  ha  he ack f 
bankruptcy applications to the courts, which results in the limited use of 
the bankruptcy law in China. The policymakers in China may need to 
discipline courts to conform to bankruptcy law in the first place. In 
addition, this study discovers that among legal practitioners, especially 
commercial lawyers, there is a strong appeal for the full implementation 
 
136 Yong Zhang (张勇), Canyu Fenpei yu Pochan zai Qiye Faren Zhaiwu Qingchang 
Zhong de Xuanze Shiyong (参与分 与 产在企业 人债务 偿中 择 ) 
[Choice between Fair Distribution and Bankruptcy When Company Debtors Could 
Not Pay Debts], 11 Renmin Sifa (人 司 ) [PEOPLE S JUDICATURE] 49, 52 (2015) 
(noting the value of bankruptcy procedures in collecting more assets for the benefits 
of creditors).  
137 See Han Changyin ( 印) & Zhu Chunhe ( 和), Canyu Fenpei Zhidu he 
Pochan Lifa (参与分 制度和 产 ) [Fair Distribution in Judgment Executions 
and Bankruptcy Regimes], 1 Dangdai Faxue (当代 学) [CONTEMP. L. REV.] 54, 56 
(2000). 
138 Zhang, supra note 27, at 160 (this is also observed by this judge from the China 
S e e Pe e  C ); see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. 
ed. 1999) (arguing justice as fairness). 
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of the corporate bankruptcy law in China. But unfortunately, due to 
institutional constraints and a lack of political will, the Chinese state in 
general and its judicial system in particular behave rather inadequately 
in delivering fairness and justice for the Chinese business community, 
hich da e  he b i e  c i  c fide ce i  he e f a  
and may hamper sustainable economic growth in China.  
The Chinese corporate bankruptcy law, arguably, may have no 
future unless and until the current heavily court-centred corporate 
bankruptcy system can be substantially reformed. This is because at the 
moment, on the one hand, most bankruptcy judges feel overwhelmed, 
and on the other hand, they micromanage every detailed issue of 
bankruptcy cases. 139  Moreover, China may nurture the newly-
established insolvency practitioner profession by allocating more work 
to them so as to build an effective and competitive insolvency service 
market.140  
Finally, the findings of this study suggest that, given the largely 
failed bankruptcy substitute in practice, China has no option but to face 
and tackle the structural defects of its current corporate bankruptcy 
system, which will test the political will and legislative wisdom of the 
Chinese ruling class.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 For instance, under Article 62 of the EBL 2006, it is even the duty of bankruptcy 
j dge   c e e he fi  c edi  ee i g, hich i  b i  ece a  and 
unjustified. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 57, art. 62. 
140 See The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part 2 III B (United Nations, New York, 2005) 
(suggesting the role of insolvency representatives/practitioners). See also The World 
Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, D8 (rev. draft, 
Dec. 21, 2005) (highlighting the role of insolvency practitioners).  
